Cite as: 608 U. S. ____ (2026) 31 Opinion of the Court less weight. Shaw II, 517 U. S., at 909–910. Far more germane are “current data” and “ ‘current political conditions’ ” that shed light on current intentional discrimination. Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 552–553 (quoting Northwest Austin Municipal Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U. S. 193, 203 (2009)). “[I]n large part because of the Voting Rights Act[,] . . . our Nation has made great strides” in eliminating racial discrimination in voting. Shelby County, 570 U. S., at 548–549. And if, as a result of this progress, it is hard to find pertinent evidence relating to intentional present-day voting discrimination, that is cause for celebration. D Nothing in Allen dictates a result that differs from the one we reach today. The decision in that case was based on the State of Alabama’s specific argument that its “raceneutral benchmark” was “necessary in any redistricting case.” Brief for Appellants in Allen v. Milligan, O. T. 2022, Nos. 21–1086 etc., pp. 43–44 (Brief for Alabama). Alabama argued that deriving this benchmark—the “median or average number of majority-minority districts” in a race-blind “multimillion-map set,” Allen, 599 U. S., at 23—required “computer simulations that are technically complicated, expensive to produce, and available to ‘[o]nly a small cadre of university researchers [that] have the resources and expertise to run’ them,” id., at 36 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28). Nonetheless, the State contended that its race-neutral benchmark was “the only plausible test” to ensure that §2 stays within “constitutional guardrails.” Brief for Alabama 44, 75. We rejected that “singleminded view.” Allen, 599 U. S., at 26. Allen, in short, was about whether Alabama’s novel evidentiary standard required a change to our existing §2 precedent. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 8–9. It did not.