4 LOUISIANA v. CALLAIS Syllabus (1) The first Gingles precondition is that a community of minority voters must be sufficiently numerous and compact to constitute a majority in a reasonably configured district. While many §2 plaintiffs have simply provided illustrative maps with their desired number of majority-minority districts, such maps prove only that the State could create an additional majority-minority district, not that the State’s failure to do so violated §2 of the Voting Rights Act. To show the latter, plaintiffs’ illustrative maps must satisfy two conditions: Plaintiffs cannot use race as a districting criterion in drawing illustrative maps, and illustrative maps must meet all the State’s legitimate districting objectives, including traditional districting criteria and the State’s specified political goals. Pp. 29–30. (2) To satisfy the second and third preconditions—politically cohesive voting by the minority and racial-bloc voting by the majority—the plaintiffs must provide an analysis that controls for party affiliation, showing that voters engage in racial-bloc voting that cannot be explained by partisan affiliation. P. 30. (3) On the “totality of circumstances” inquiry, the focus must be on evidence that has more than a remote bearing on what the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits: present-day intentional racial discrimination regarding voting. Discrimination that occurred some time ago and present-day disparities characterized as ongoing “effects of societal discrimination” are entitled to much less weight. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U. S. 899, 909–910. Pp. 30–31. (c) Nothing in Allen v. Milligan, 599 U. S. 1, dictates a different result. That case merely addressed whether Alabama’s novel evidentiary standard required a change to existing §2 precedent. Allen did not address whether “race-based redistricting” under §2 could “extend indefinitely into the future” despite significant changes in conditions, 599 U. S., at 45 (KAVANAUGH, J., concurring in part), nor did it address whether §2 plaintiffs must disentangle race from politics in proving their case. Indeed, Allen did not address the Fourteenth Amendment at all. But here, the decision before the Court is based on the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 31–32. (d) Under the updated Gingles framework, the facts of this suit easily require affirmance. Louisiana’s enactment of SB8 triggered strict scrutiny because the State’s underlying goal was racial. The State configured District 6 to achieve a black voting-age population over 50% because the Robinson court held that §2 likely required the creation of an additional majority-black district. The State’s intentional compliance with the court’s demands constituted an “express acknowledgment that race played a role in the drawing of district lines.” Alexander, 602 U. S., at 8. No compelling interest justifies SB8 because §2 did not require the