27 costs of their generic get-out-the-vote efforts and voter registration activities. 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(c). By “generic,” the regulations mean those activities that refer to a party but do not promote or oppose a particular candidate. See id. § 100.25. This provision violates the First Amendment because non-profits are constitutionally entitled to pay 100% of the costs of such voter drive activities out of their soft-money accounts. See Cal. Med. Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. (MCFL), 479 U.S. 238, 259-63 (1986); FEC v. Nat’l Conservative PAC (NCPAC), 470 U.S. 480, 501 (1985); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 298-99 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45-48 (1976). Second, the regulations mandate that covered non-profits use their hard-money accounts for 50% of any generic communications that refer to a party without referring to a candidate, for example, “Support the Democratic party.” 11 C.F.R. § 106.6(c). This provision likewise violates the First Amendment because non-profits are constitutionally entitled to pay 100% of the costs of such communications out of their soft-money accounts. See Cal-Med, 453 U.S. at 203 (opinion of Blackmun, J.); see also MCFL, 479 U.S. at 259-63; NCPAC, 470 U.S. at 501; Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298-99; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45-48. from the Supreme Court’s consistent holdings that large expenditures are constitutionally protected and the corresponding principle that non-profits are constitutionally entitled to accept large donations to their soft-money accounts to support advertisements, get-out-the-vote efforts, and voter registration activities. Of course, because of the lesser First Amendment protection against disclosure, the major purpose test is permissible under current precedent for determining non-profits’ disclosure obligations. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.