32 1705, 1715 (1999). But this perceived anomaly has existed to some extent since Buckley, which recognized that contribution limitations “alone would not reduce the greater potential voice of affluent persons and well-financed groups, who would remain free to spend unlimited sums directly to promote candidates and policies they favor in an effort to persuade voters.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 n.26. And McConnell similarly took note of the fact that, even after that decision upholding regulations on contributions to parties, “[i]nterest groups . . . remain free to raise soft money to fund voter registration, GOTV activities, mailings,” and advertisements. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 187 (2003). If eliminating this perceived asymmetry is deemed necessary, the constitutionally permitted legislative solution, as the Court stated in an analogous situation in Davis, is “to raise or eliminate” limits on contributions to parties or candidates. 128 S. Ct. at 2774. But it is not permissible, at least under current Supreme Court precedents, to remove the incongruity by placing these limits on spending by or donations to non-profits. IV In addition to its First Amendment challenge to the five regulatory provisions, EMILY’s List alternatively contends that three of the five provisions exceed the FEC’s statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (agency may not act “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right.”). We agree. When enacting BCRA in 2002, Congress did not authorize the FEC to restrict donations to or spending by nonprofits – even though Congress was aware that BCRA’s restrictions on political parties meant that independent non-