42 the provision in § 106.6(c) requiring that covered non-profits use their federal or hard-money accounts to pay for at least 50% of their generic get-out-the-vote and voter registration activities. Nor does EMILY’s List raise a statutory challenge to the provision in § 106.6(c) requiring that covered nonprofits use hard money to pay for at least 50% of their generic communications. Compare EMILY’s List Br. at 38-39 (discussing only administrative expenses provision of § 106.6(c) in statutory section of brief) with EMILY’s List Br. at 32 (raising constitutional challenges to all provisions of § 106.6(c)). Indeed, footnote 11 of EMILY’s List’s brief all but concedes that, under the statute, the FEC may require use of hard money for these generic activities. EMILY’s List’s decision not to target these two provisions of § 106.6(c) on statutory grounds appears wise. Such an argument would be very difficult to square with McConnell’s several pointed statements that FECA permits the FEC to treat generic activities as entirely federal for purposes of contribution and expenditure limits. In fact, McConnell harshly criticized the FEC for not having previously treated political parties’ generic activities as entirely federal activities subject to FECA’s limits. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 142 (by allowing generic activities to be funded largely with soft money, FEC’s allocation regime “subverted” original FECA scheme); id. at 167 (FECA scheme “eroded” by FEC’s allocation regime); see also id. at 142 n.44.22 22 The concurrence finds “perplexing[]” our reading of McConnell’s statutory discussion. Concurring Op. at 10. We think it’s straightforward. McConnell said the statutory phrase “for the purpose of influencing” federal elections covers generic activities. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 167. That seems to foreclose any statutory challenge to the new regulatory provisions applicable to generic