15 for EMILY’s List offered this succinct critique of the court’s holding: The Court: Can you deal with [FEC’s counsel’s] response on [Cal-Med]? EMILY’s List: Yes. I mean, Cal[-]Med is mysteriously produced here for the FEC’s position. Cal[-]Med didn’t raise any of the issues in this case. Cal[-]Med was a simple question of whether a committee that was making contributions to federal candidates had to observe a limit on contributions made to that federal program. That set a law now, that’s certainly what EMILY’s List does. I don’t think it bears at all on this invasion of our state and local programs through the promulgation of these excessive federal regulatory schemes. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 32–33. How true. But even if it were judicially proper for me to do so, and even if the issues were briefed, I doubt I could join the court’s opinion in full. This is not because I dislike its outcome. Indeed, I agree with what seems to be the unstated premise: if the Supreme Court’s cases made any sense, the First Amendment would protect much more than pornography, profanity, and pyrotechnics. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). The amendment’s “purpose,” after all, is “to