20 As such, it supports Democratic candidates for federal office. See Matthew B. Stannard, Cash is Key for Tauscher’s Replacement, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 24, 2009, at A1, available at 2009 WLNR 16474721 (noting that a candidate in a federal primary race “has touted the endorsement of EMILY’s List, a national fundraising organization that supported [former U.S. Representative Ellen Tauscher] and backs Democratic women who support abortion rights.”). Thus, EMILY’s List is much more like a political party than the Sierra Club or the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. Whether, under the high court’s current precedents, EMILY’s List could be regulated exactly like a political party is unknown. That it should not be regulated more harshly than a political party seems to be the committee’s complaint with the FEC regulations challenged in this court. EMILY’s List Br. at 39 (“Bizarrely, [the regulation] also treats nonparty PACs more harshly than any other type of committee, save national parties and candidates themselves.”). My point is not that McConnell mandates such treatment; only that nothing in the opinion’s logic clearly precludes it. The court does not think this is “a persuasive interpretation of McConnell.” Maj. Op. at 38. Perhaps the court is right. But reading the case, as the court does, to sanction First Amendment immunity for all non-connected nonprofits seems even more implausible. B. Precedent holds allocation and solicitation rules are contribution limits. This is key, as such limits receive less than “strict scrutiny,” given they “‘entail only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free communication.’” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 134–35 (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20)). The “‘overall effect’ of dollar limits on contributions is [also] ‘merely to require candidates