23 soliciting by them is facially valid, given the “close connection and alignment of interests” between national parties and federal candidates. Id. at 155. The Court’s discussion of national parties by itself raises difficulties for the court, especially because the Court already seemingly has held there is a “close connection and alignment of interests” between committees like EMILY’s List and federal candidates. In Cal-Med, the Court sustained contribution limits to multicandidate committees. Four justices adopted the Conference Report’s conclusion that these committees may “‘appear to be separate entities pursuing their own ends, but are actually a means for advancing a candidate’s campaign,’” 453 U.S. at 199 n.18 (plurality opinion) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1057, pp. 57–58 (1976)). Justice Blackmun penned a concurring opinion, but did not disclaim the Conference Report or disagree with the Court’s ultimate holding. In fact, he expressly said “contributions to multicandidate committees may be limited to $5,000 per year as a means of preventing evasion [of contribution limits],” though he noted in dicta that his conclusion would be different if the committee “makes only independent expenditures” and so does not “pose a perceived threat of actual or potential corruption.” Id. at 203 (opinion of Blackmun, J.) (emphasis added). If Congress can forbid all allocation and solicitation of soft money by national parties, how is it unconstitutional to forbid only some allocation and solicitation of soft money by multicandidate committees that are also closely aligned with federal candidates? The court disputes this reading of Cal-Med, claiming there are not just two types of political committees (ones that only make independent expenditures, and all others), but actually three: (1) those that only make independent