26 contributions) would have provided insufficient justification for such overbroad legislation. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 152 n.48. That the Court may have created a doctrinal anomaly might suggest, as the court argues, see Maj. Op. at 23 n.13, that it could not possibly have meant what it said, but that is a hard argument to make. Often cases are in tension as doctrine works itself pure. Our duty as an intermediate court is not to tell the Court what it ought to have said, but to abide by what it did say. But even leaving aside its treatment of national parties, McConnell further undermines the court. Recognizing the dynamic—indeed, Sisyphean—character of campaign finance law, the Court noted “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.” 540 U.S. at 224. Upon realizing structural forces inherent in a republic inevitably create incentives for those subject to regulation to petition for relief and to campaign against those who are disinclined to grant it, the Court did not retreat to a more manageable and less burdensome “quid pro quo” standard. Id. at 296 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Instead, after upholding § 323(a), the Court emphasized money would now “corrupt” federal races by other, more subtle routes, so Congress, in anticipation of this new corruption, can enact broad anti-circumvention measures. E.g., id. at 165–66. Indeed, without pointing to any evidence that local officials (e.g., county assessors) are connected to federal candidates (e.g., for President of the United States) or have been used to circumvent the law, the Court held Congress prophylactically can regulate them without facially offending the Constitution. See id. at 184–85. If the First Amendment is flexible enough to allow regulating local officials because contributions might flow through them to federal candidates, then why can’t the