29 C. Recall how the Court in McConnell concluded its opinion: “‘To say that Congress is without power to pass appropriate legislation to safeguard an election from the improper use of money to influence the result is to deny the nation in a vital particular the power of self protection.’” 540 U.S. at 223–24 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545 (1934)). This “conviction” compelled the Court to uphold “Congress’s most recent effort to confine the ill effects of aggregated wealth on our political system” by “control[ing]. . . soft money.” Id. at 224. But the Court was “under no illusion that BCRA will be the last congressional statement on the matter”—“[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.” Id. While I have argued courts should not unnecessarily assail legislative acts, political speech is the core of what the First Amendment protects. From Buckley to McConnell the Court has relied on an ad hoc empiricism ill-suited to the complex interactions of democratic politics. The government has unlimited resources, public and private, for touting its policy agenda. Those on the outside—whether voices of opposition, encouragement, or innovation—must rely on private wealth to make their voices heard. An increasingly anomalous campaign finance jurisprudence only impoverishes this essential debate. McConnell’s careless invocation of access and influence (two integral aspects of political participation) as synonyms for corruption is instructive. Such an expansive, self-referential, and amorphous definition of corruption, coupled with lax standards of scrutiny and a willingness to accept as “evidence” any plausible theory of corruption or claim of circumvention, is likely to doom any argument for protection of core political speech. Someday the Supreme