him, it was too late. He saw no bar to the 2nd respondent raising these objections. As clearly indicated in the judgment prepared by my learned brother S.G Engwau JA, this Court granted leave to file a consolidate Memorandum of Appeal in which paragraph 1 reads; “That the learned trial judge erred in law and fact and denied the 2nd appellant Fair Trial when she considered and relied on specific particulars of alleged bribery not specifically pleaded in the petition and its attached Affidavit to make findings that during the Parliamentary committed conduct Elections, illegal of the practices Mukono 2nd and/or North Appellant offences personally or by his agents with his consent, knowledge or approval.” In the issues which were framed by both counsel for the parties for determination by the Court, issue 4 thereof captures the substance of the above ground in the following words. “4 Whether the learned trial judge denied the 2nd appellant a fair trial when she considered and relied on particulars of alleged bribery not specifically pleaded in the petition.” Those two paragraphs, to my mind, offer a proper foundation for the 2nd respondent to raise the objections he raises. Further, our careful perusal of the record reveals to us that in fact, counsel for the 2nd respondent raised substantially similar objections at the trial. At page 312 of the record the following passage is found: “2.30 Pm BYENKYA (contnd) BRIBERY-7(a) C/S 68(i) PEA i) these allegations of bribery are not properly pleaded as required by the law. See Article 4(8) of PEA Rules. The petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit and list of documents to be relied on.