Chapter 4 • Independence and Impartiality of Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers qualified judges from among women and members of minorities”.17 The Human Rights Committee has also recommended to Bolivia that “the nomination of judges be based on their competence and not their political affiliation”.18 With regard to Zambia, the Human Rights Committee has expressed concern about “the proposals made by the Constitutional Review Committee in regard to the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court by the President after their retirement and the removal of Supreme Court judges by the President, subject only to ratification by the National Assembly without any safeguard or inquiry by an independent judicial tribunal”. It concluded that such proposals were “incompatible with the independence of the judiciary and run counter to article 14 of the Covenant”.19 Consequently, article 14 of the Covenant has not been complied with in cases where judges are appointed or dismissed by the President without these decisions having been taken in consultation with some independent legal authority, even where the President’s decisions must be ratified by Parliament. Likewise, as regards Slovakia the Committee has noted with concern that the rules in force “governing the appointment of judges by the Government with approval of Parliament could have a negative effect on the independence of the judiciary”; it recommended that “specific measures be adopted as a matter of priority guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary and protecting judges from any form of political influence, through the adoption of laws regulating the appointment, remuneration, tenure, dismissal and disciplining of members of the judiciary”.20 With regard to the Republic of the Congo, the Committee expressed its “concern at the attacks on the independence of the judiciary in violation of” article 14(1), and drew attention to the fact that such independence was “limited owing to the lack of any independent mechanism responsible for the recruitment and discipline of judges, and to the many pressures and influences, including those of the executive branch, to which the judges [were] subjected”.21 It therefore recommended to the State party that it should “take the appropriate steps to ensure the independence of the judiciary, in particular by amending the rules concerning the composition and operation of the Supreme Council of Justice and its effective establishment”.22 Appointments of judges must, in other words, in themselves constitute a strong factor for independence and cannot be left to the exclusive discretion of the Executive and Legislature. The question of “lack of full independence of the judiciary” has also arisen in connection with Kyrgyzstan, when the Committee noted, in particular, “that the applicable certification procedure for judges, the requirement of re-evaluation every seven years, the low level of salaries and the uncertain tenure of judges may encourage corruption and bribery”.23 17 UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. I), para. 132. 18 UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. I), para. 224. 19 UN doc. GAOR, A/51/40, para. 202. 20 UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), para. 379. 21 UN doc. GAOR, A/55/40 (vol. I), para. 279. 22 Ibid., para. 280. 23 UN doc. GAOR, A/55/40 (vol. I), para. 405. 124 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers