Chapter 6 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part I – From Investigation to Trial involved and on the circumstances of the case”.79 In the case of Murray, the European Court explained its position in the following terms: “63. National laws may attach consequences to the attitude of an accused at the initial stages of police interrogation which are decisive for the prospects of the defence in any subsequent criminal proceedings. In such circumstances Article 6 will normally require that the accused be allowed to benefit from the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation. However, this right, which is not explicitly set out in the Convention, may be subject to restrictions for good cause. The question, in each case, is whether the restriction, in the light of the entirety of the proceedings, has deprived the accused of a fair hearing.”80 Early access to a lawyer: The Murray case In the case of Murray, the applicant was refused access to a lawyer during the first 48 hours of his detention, a measure decided under Section 15 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987 “on the basis that the police had reasonable grounds to believe that the exercise of the right of access would, inter alia, interfere with the gathering of information about the commission of acts of terrorism or make it more difficult to prevent such an act”.81 The applicant was cautioned under the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 that, if he chose to remain silent, inferences might be drawn in support of evidence against him. The European Court considered that the scheme contained in the said Order “... is such that it is of paramount importance for the rights of the defence that an accused has access to a lawyer at the initial stages of police interrogation. It observes ... that, under the Order, at the beginning of police interrogation, an accused is confronted with a fundamental dilemma relating to his defence. If he chooses to remain silent, adverse inferences may be drawn against him in accordance with the provisions of the Order. On the other hand, if the accused opts to break his silence during the course of interrogation, he runs the risk of prejudicing his defence without necessarily removing the possibility of inferences being drawn against him.82 It then concluded that, “under such conditions the concept of fairness enshrined in Article 6 requires that the accused has the benefit of the assistance of a lawyer already at the initial stages of police interrogation”, and that “to deny access to a lawyer for the first 48 hours of police questioning, in a situation where the rights of the defence may well be irretrievably prejudiced, is – whatever the justification for such denial – incompatible with the rights of the accused under Article 6”.83 79 Ibid., loc. cit. 80 Ibid., pp. 54-55, para. 63. 81 Ibid., p. 55, para. 64. 82 Ibid., para. 66. 83 Ibid., loc. cit. Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers 239