Chapter 7 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part II – From Trial to Final Judgement It is in principle for the State party concerned to show that the complexity of a case is such as to justify the delay under consideration by the Committee,63 although a mere affirmation that the delay was not excessive is not sufficient;64 the Committee will also examine whether the delay, or part of it, can be attributed to the authors, for instance when they decide to change lawyers.65 The case of Pratt and Morgan In the case of Pratt and Morgan, the authors were unable to proceed to appeal to the Privy Council because it took the Court of Appeal almost three years and nine months to issue a written judgement. The Committee did not accept the explanation of the State party that this delay “was attributable to an oversight and that the authors should have asserted their right to receive earlier the written judgement”; on the contrary, it considered that the responsibility for this delay lay with the judicial authorities, a responsibility that “is neither dependent on a request for production by the counsel in a trial nor is non-fulfilment of this responsibility excused by the absence of a request from the accused”.66 In reaching its conclusion that this delay violated both article 14(3)(c) and (5), the Committee stated that “it matters not in the event that the Privy Council affirmed the conviction of the authors”, since “in all cases, and especially in capital cases, accused persons are entitled to trial and appeal without undue delay, whatever the outcome of those judicial proceedings turns out to be”.67 The Human Rights Committee has examined numerous other cases involving alleged violations of this right, and only a few examples of its jurisprudence will be highlighted here. In one case, the Committee concluded that a delay of 29 months from arrest to trial was contrary to article 14(3)(c); the mere affirmation by the State party that such a delay was not contrary to the Covenant did not constitute a sufficient explanation.68 A delay of two years between arrest and trial was also considered to violate article 14(3)(c) (and article 9(3)) of the Covenant, and it was therefore not necessary for the Committee to “decide whether the further delays in the conduct of the trial [were] attributable to the State party or not”.69 A fortiori, proceedings that have 63 Communication No. 336/1988, A. Fillastre v. Bolivia (Views adopted on 5 November 1991), in UN doc. GAOR, A/47/40, p. 306, para. 6.6. 64 Communication No. 639/1995, W. Lawson Richards and T. Walker v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 28 July 1997), in UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), p. 189, para. 8.2. 65 Communication No. 526/1993, M. and B. Hill v. Spain (Views adopted on 2 April 1997), in UN doc. GAOR, A/52/40 (vol. II), p. 17, para. 12.4. 66 Ibid., p. 230, para. 13.4. 67 Ibid., para. 13.5. 68 Communication No. 564/1993, J. Leslie v. Jamaica (Views adopted on 31 July 1998), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II), p. 28, para. 9.3. 69 Communication No. 672/1995, C. Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago (Views adopted on 29 July 1998), in UN doc. GAOR, A/53/40 (vol. II), p. 149, para. 10.2. 268 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers