Chapter 7 • The Right to a Fair Trial: Part II – From Trial to Final Judgement As to the conduct of the applicant, it is worthy of note that the European Court has held that article 6 “does not require a person charged with a criminal offence to cooperate actively with the judicial authorities”, and that, further, it does not blame the applicant for taking “full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in their defence”, although this may slow down the proceedings to some extent.79 The case might however be different if there is evidence showing that the applicant and his counsel have displayed a “determination to be obstructive”.80 The judicial authorities were, however, responsible for the unreasonable delay of the proceedings contrary to article 6 in the case of Yagci — and Sargin, where, contrary to national law, the courts had held only an average of one hearing per month, and where they waited for almost six months before acquitting the applicants on the basis of newly repealed articles of the Criminal Code which had constituted part of the basis of the criminal charges against them. In all, the proceedings lasted a little less than four years and eight months.81 It does not help in this respect that Governments invoke their international responsibility to look carefully into all matters in serious cases of drug trafficking in order to justify delays. In this respect the Court has unequivocally held that it “is for the Contracting States to organize their legal systems in such a way that their courts can meet” the requirement of reasonableness.82 Similarly, in civil proceedings, it is no defence for the State concerned to argue that its Code of Civil Procedure leaves the initiative to the parties, who are expected to carry out the procedural steps in the manner and within the time prescribed. The European Court has held in this respect that such a rule does not “dispense the courts from ensuring compliance with Article 6 as to the ‘reasonable time’ requirement”.83 The national judge does, in other words, have an obligation to intervene when necessary to expedite proceedings so as not to jeopardize the “effectiveness and credibility” of the administration of justice.84 Every person charged with a criminal offence has the right to be tried without undue delay/within a reasonable time. All States have a duty to organize the Judiciary in such a way that this right can be effectively ensured. The accused cannot be blamed for delays caused by his or her making use of the right not to speak or to cooperate with the judicial authorities. Judicial delays can only be attributed to the accused in cases of deliberate obstructive behaviour. 79 Eur. Court HR, Case of Yagci — and Sargin v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A, No. 319-A, p. 21, para. 66. 80 Ibid., loc. cit. 81 Ibid., p. 22, paras. 67-70. 82 Eur. Court HR, Case of Mansur v. Turkey, judgment of 8 June 1995, Series A, No. 319-B, p. 53, para. 68; emphasis added. 83 Eur. Court HR, Vernillo Case v. France, judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A, No. 198, para. 30 at p. 13. 84 Cf. ibid., p. 14, para. 38 read in conjunction with p. 14, para. 36. Owing inter alia “to the parties’ responsibilities in the conduct of the trial” the relevant periods in this case were not so long as to constitute a violation of the requirement of reasonableness, see ibid., p. 15, para. 39. 270 Human Rights in the Administration of Justice: A Manual on Human Rights for Judges, Prosecutors and Lawyers