A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO INCREASING WOMEN’S ACCESS TO ELECTORAL JUSTICE Finding 8: ADR processes could be opportunities for women’s electoral justice complaints to be heard, but they may also be vulnerable to the same institutional and cultural biases as formal electoral judicial processes. ADR processes are relatively informal, consensus-driven processes that can be used to resolve electoral disputes outside of formal judicial and institutional processes. ADR can involve “a range of approaches – from negotiation, to mediation, to fact finding mechanisms, to semi-private decision-making forums such as binding arbitration – that are intended to help parties reach agreements. They supplement and enhance a country’s formal judicial processes, by providing an alternative avenue for parties to resolve their disputes.”117 Some ADR processes, such as those facilitated by non-state justice providers, can be “more accessible, affordable, trusted and transparent, and can provide a swifter and fairer response,” but they can also be “discriminatory or exclusionary” and “often replicate and reinforce dominant power structures and gender bias.”118 Recent IFES research found that ADR structures can often reproduce and perpetuate issues found in more formal EDR systems; in fact, “traditional or customary ADR mechanisms are often dominated by elders, community or religious leaders, and therefore also likely to be led by men. The same applies to mediation led by political party leaders.”119 In addition, “evidence from such bodies outside the electoral field shows that they have often prioritized the goal of achieving resolution of the conflict, without necessarily taking account of issues that are particularly important or relevant to women, in particular gender-based or sexual violence.”120 A related concern is that ADR mechanisms – because they are meant to be an alternative way to resolve disputes in order to avoid the formal justice system – may lead to increased pressure on women to abandon their claims in the interest of preserving community cohesion or promoting conflict resolution over justice and accountability. In instances when the responsible institution for ADR is also the subject of a complaint, this conflict of interest could be harmful for the justice process. For example, if a woman party member were to bring forward a dispute related to party nomination to an internal party dispute resolution process, she could face pressure to drop her claim, as party leadership would not want negative press and also would not want to rule in her favor (as they are likely to have made the decision that she is disputing). While men might also be reluctant to bring forward disputes for the same reason, male party members often have greater access to and stronger relationships with party leaders and, because of societal gender biases, might not be punished in the same way that women would. A 2016 IFES EDR assessment in Kenya also posited that “there is also a risk that ADR mechanisms can be used to make legitimate grievances ‘go away,’ to the detriment of the complainant (and this may disproportionately affect women and other marginalized groups).”121 If cases brought to ADR bodies are seen as less legitimate, it may be more difficult to get fair and meaningful resolution to legitimate claims through these bodies. 117 Vickery, Chad, ed., (2011, May 16). Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating and Resolving Disputes in Elections (GUARDE). IFES – The International Foundation for Electoral Systems. 118 Gordon, 2019, p. 6. 119 Roblot, Cox, and Anyanwu. (2024). 120 Ibid. 121 Ellena, K., and Roblot, T. (2016, November). Election Dispute Resolution Assessment White Paper. IFES Kenya. (Not publicly available). 43