irrespective of the length of the sentence and irrespective of the nature or gravity of their offence and their individual circumstances, it is not compatible with [A3P1].” However, the Grand Chamber (reversing the simple Chamber) found no contravention in relation to the Italian law in issue in Scoppola. The only dissent, by Judge Thór Björgvinsson, related to this conclusion. The Italian law was held compatible with the Convention because disenfranchisement applied only to sentences of three or more years, and lasted for only five years in the case of sentences of three to five years, though for life in the case of longer sentences. The Grand Chamber said that “As a result, a large number of convicted prisoners are not deprived of the right to vote” (paras 106 and 108). Furthermore, any prisoner could, three years after completing his sentence, apply for “rehabilitation”, which would be granted upon his displaying “consistent and genuine good conduct” and would “terminate any ancillary penalties and other penal effect of the conviction” including disenfranchisement (Scoppola, paras 38 and 109). 23. The Grand Chamber specifically rejected the Chamber view that any decision to deprive a prisoner of the vote should be taken by a court, saying (para 99): “While the intervention of a judge is in principle likely to guarantee the proportionality of restrictions on prisoners' voting rights, such restrictions will not necessarily be automatic, general and indiscriminate simply because they were not ordered by a judge. Indeed, the circumstances in which the right to vote is forfeited may be detailed in the law, making its application conditional on such factors as the nature or the gravity of the offence committed.” 24. Judge Thór Björgvinsson dissented because in his view the Grand Chamber judgment in Scoppola “offer[ed] a very narrow interpretation of the Hirst judgment” which stripped it of “all its bite” (para OI-16). In particular, the Grand Chamber had in his view overlooked significant elements of the reasoning in Hirst (No 2), notably the absence of any direct link between the facts of the individual case and the ban on voting, the bluntness of the Italian legislation, “just like the UK legislation”, and the absence of evidence that either the legislature or the courts had weighed the proportionality of the ban (para 0I-13). Page 16