(No 2) did not endorse this reference in para 49 of the simple Chamber’s judgment to an additional anomaly, saying only that it “would not in any event be right for the Court to assume that, if Parliament were to amend the current law, restrictions on the right to vote would necessarily still apply to post-tariff life prisoners or to conclude that such an amendment would necessarily be compatible with [A3P1]” (para 72). Only in a concurring opinion of Judge Caflisch did he raise the point, going so far as to say that “this may be the essential point for the present case” (para O-17(d)). His opinion does not appear to have been shared by other judges, and must now in any event be seen in the light of the decision in Scoppola, accepting that a lifelong ban on voting by prisoners sentenced for five or more years was legitimate. The additional fact that it was subject to removal after three years had elapsed from release, “provided that the offender has displayed consistent and genuine good behaviour” does not appear to have been critical to this conclusion; but, however that may be, it points strongly in favour of a view that it can be legitimate to withhold a prisoner’s voting rights until “satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined”. 41. The Grand Chamber’s reasoning in its very recent decision in Vinter v United Kingdom (Application Nos 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10; 9 July 2013), which post-dated submissions in this case, is also worth noting for its explanation of detention during a post-tariff period by reference to core aims of imprisonment: “108. First, a life sentence does not become irreducible by the mere fact that in practice it may be served in full. No issue arises under Article 3 if a life sentence is de jure and de facto reducible ….. In this respect, the Court would emphasise that no Article 3 issue could arise if, for instance, a life prisoner had the right under domestic law to be considered for release but was refused on the ground that he or she continued to pose a danger to society. This is because States have a duty under the Convention to take measures for the protection of the public from violent crime and the Convention does not prohibit States from subjecting a person convicted of a serious crime to an indeterminate sentence allowing for the offender’s continued detention where necessary for the protection of the public …... Indeed, preventing a criminal from re-offending is one of the ‘essential functions’ of a prison sentence ….. This is particularly so for those convicted of murder or other serious offences against the person. The mere fact that such prisoners may have already served a long period of imprisonment does not weaken the State’s positive obligation to protect the public; States may fulfil that obligation by continuing to detain such life sentenced prisoners for as long as they remain dangerous …..” [case references omitted] Page 24