He went on to say that this “general guidance” was “also confirmed by the fact that the right in question is a fundamental right safeguarded by [A3P1]”, and to mention in a footnote that the text of article 6(2) “need merely be borne in mind” (paras 70 to 71). Turning to Spain’s second criticism, Advocate General Tizzano also derived from his conclusion that individual voting was a fundamental right of citizens of the Union a converse conclusion that it was illegitimate for the United Kingdom to deviate to any greater extent from its statement in what was then Annex II of the 1976 Act that “The United Kingdom will apply the provisions of this Act only in respect of the United Kingdom”. As stated in para 49 above, the Court of Justice adopted quite different reasoning and reached an opposite conclusion, based simply on the United Kingdom’s obligation to give effect to the European Court of Human Rights’ ruling in Matthews. 58. The Court of Justice did not therefore endorse Advocate General Tizzano’s broad approach, or import the Strasbourg jurisprudence into the general provisions of Community and Union law referring to voting in European Parliamentary elections. There was good reason for this. Eligibility to vote is under the Treaties and the 1976 Act a matter for national Parliaments, one of considerable national interest. There is no sign that the European Commission has ever sought to involve itself in or take issue with voting eligibility in Member States or specifically with the restrictions on prisoner voting which apply in a number of such States. The Strasbourg jurisprudence operates as the relevant control, albeit one that has itself proved in some respects controversial. It would not only unnecessarily duplicate that control at the European Community or Union level, it could also lead to further conflict and uncertainty. Hence the Court of Justice in Eman and Sevinger confined its reasoning to a well-established core principle of Treaty law, that of non-discrimination, in that case between different categories of Dutch national, to which I shall return (paras 60-64 below). Further, even in the form into which they have been shaped by the Treaty of Lisbon, it is notable that such provisions as the European Treaties contain concerning individual voting rights are notably limited in scope. They relate to the core Treaty concerns of equality between nationals or Union citizens and freedom of movement within the European Union (see para 59 below). For all these reasons, I reject Mr Southey’s wider submission set out in (paras 46-47 above). Articles 20.2 and 22 TFEU 59. In Mr O’Neill’s submission, the changes effected by the Treaty of Lisbon significantly altered the Treaty position considered in Spain v United Kingdom and Eman and Sevinger. In those cases article 19 EC was explained as confined to stating rules of equal treatment requiring Union citizens residing in Member States of which they were not nationals to be able to vote and stand in municipal as well as European Parliamentary elections “under the same conditions as nationals”. The same must apply to the current equivalent, article 22 TFEU. But Mr O’Neill relies Page 31