French CJ Hayne J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J 11. 30 Political communication may be undertaken legitimately to influence others to a political viewpoint. It is not simply a two-way affair between electors and government or candidates. There are many in the community who are not electors but who are governed and are affected by decisions of government. Whilst not suggesting that the freedom of political communication is a personal right or freedom, which it is not 48, it may be acknowledged that such persons and entities have a legitimate interest in governmental action and the direction of policy. The point to be made is that they, as well as electors, may seek to influence the ultimate choice of the people as to who should govern. They may do so directly or indirectly through the support of a party or a candidate who they consider best represents or expresses their viewpoint. In turn, political parties and candidates may seek to influence such persons or entities because it is understood that they will in turn contribute to the discourse about matters of politics and government. The freedom and State electoral laws 31 In the Australian constitutional context, the freedom of political communication operates as a restraint upon the exercise of legislative power by the Commonwealth and the States. The defendant submits that the constitutional context in which the freedom arises includes the constitutional premise, emerging from ss 106 and 107 and recognised by the principle in the Melbourne Corporation case 49, that the States are to continue as independent polities with their own constitutions and their own legislative functions. It follows, the defendant submits, that the freedom should not impair a State's capacity to exercise its constitutional functions: the process for elections dictated by State legislation should be regarded as unaffected by the freedom. That is to say, the defendant submits that the freedom does not operate in respect of the EFED Act. 32 The Solicitor-General for Victoria, intervening in support of the defendant, saw the matter somewhat differently – as involving a tension or "clash" between the freedom implied from the Constitution and the Melbourne Corporation principle, which is also drawn from it. In his submission, the 48 See below at [36]. 49 Melbourne Corporation v The Commonwealth (1947) 74 CLR 31 at 82; [1947] HCA 26: "The foundation of the Constitution is the conception of a central government and a number of State governments separately organized. The Constitution predicates their continued existence as independent entities."