French CJ Hayne J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J 13. endeavour to quarantine State legislation from the operation of the freedom. There is no constitutional principle which accepts that the States can legislate to affect the Commonwealth Constitution, including its implications. What was proposed by Gaudron J in the passage in Muldowney referred to above was immediately qualified by the words, "[a]t least that is so if it does not interfere with the democratic processes of the Commonwealth." And, as Victoria accepted, if the provisions of the EFED Act in question are considered to have a wider effect upon political discussion generally, then the Melbourne Corporation principle may not be relevant. That concession is properly made. The EFED Act does affect the freedom. This is so despite the attempt of s 83 and cl 34A of the Regulations to quarantine the effect of the EFED Act. Section 96D – a burden on the freedom? 35 The first question posed by Lange 54 is whether s 96D effectively burdens the freedom of political communication either in its terms, operation or effect. It requires consideration as to how the section affects the freedom generally 55. 36 In addressing this question, it is important to bear in mind that what the Constitution protects is not a personal right 56. A legislative prohibition or restriction on the freedom is not to be understood as affecting a person's right or freedom to engage in political communication, but as affecting communication on those subjects more generally. The freedom is to be understood as addressed to legislative power, not rights, and as effecting a restriction on that power. Thus the question is not whether a person is limited in the way that he or she can 54 (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 567. 55 Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 at 31 [80]. 56 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 150; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104 at 125, 149, 162, 166-167; [1994] HCA 46; Cunliffe v The Commonwealth (1994) 182 CLR 272 at 326; Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520 at 560; Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506 at 554 [92]; Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 at 31 [80]; Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide (2013) 87 ALJR 289 at 329 [166]; 295 ALR 197 at 245; [2013] HCA 3; Monis v The Queen (2013) 87 ALJR 340 at 393-394 [266]; 295 ALR 259 at 326.