French CJ Hayne J Crennan J Kiefel J Bell J 14. express himself or herself 57, although identification of that limiting effect may be necessary to an understanding of the operation of a statutory provision upon the freedom more generally. The central question is: how does the impugned law affect the freedom? 37 The plaintiffs submit that the making of a political donation is a form of political communication which the legislation denies. If the submission is to be understood as referring to a restriction effected by the EFED Act upon the right of particular persons and entities to make communications, it may blur the distinction referred to above concerning the freedom. 38 In any event, the question whether s 96D limits the freedom is simply resolved. That section effects a restriction upon the funds available to political parties and candidates to meet the costs of political communication by restricting the source of those funds. The public funding provided by the EFED Act is not equivalent to the amount which may be paid by way of electoral communication expenditure under the Act. It is not suggested that a party or candidate is likely to spend less than the maximum allowed. The party or the candidate will therefore need to fund the gap. It follows that the freedom is effectively burdened. The concession made by the defendant, that there is an indirect burden which is more than inconsequential, is inevitable. 39 The same conclusion as to the first limb of Lange was reached in ACTV regarding the restrictions placed upon political advertising. Regardless of the legitimacy of its purpose (which may have been to effect a level playing field), the legislative restriction in ACTV was, critically, held to impair the freedom 58, thus requiring further consideration as to whether the restriction was justified. 40 The identification of the extent of the burden imposed on the freedom is not relevant to this first enquiry. The defendant's submissions that s 96D places "no material burden" on the freedom, that it is "not substantial" and that its significance is "greatly reduced" by reason of the availability of public funding 57 As observed by Professor Twomey in "The Application of the Implied Freedom of Political Communication to State Electoral Funding Laws", (2012) 35 University of New South Wales Law Journal 625 at 628, citing APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW) (2005) 224 CLR 322 at 451 [381] and Wotton v Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1 at 31 [80]. 58 Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106 at 131-132.