Cite as: 541 U. S. 509 (2004) Opinion of the Court filing fees in certain family-law and criminal cases,2 ' the duty to provide transcripts to criminal defendants seeking review of their convictions, 22 and the duty to provide counsel to certain criminal defendants. 23 Each of these cases makes clear that ordinary considerations of cost and convenience alone cannot justify a State's failure to provide individuals with a meaningful right of access to the courts. Judged against this backdrop, Title II's affirmative obligation to accommodate persons with disabilities in the administration of justice cannot be said to be "so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior." Boerne, 521 U. S., at 532; Kimel, 528 U. S., at 86.1 It is, rather, a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably targeted to a legitimate end. For these reasons, we conclude that Title II, as it applies to the class of cases implicating the fundamental right of ac2 'Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371 (1971) (divorce filing fee); M. L. B. v. S. L. J, 519 U. S. 102 (1996) (record fee in parental rights termination action); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U. S. 708 (1961) (filing fee for habeas petitions); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U. S. 252 (1959) (filing fee for direct appeal in criminal case). I Griffin v. Illinois,351 U. S. 12 (1956). 2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963) (trial counsel for persons charged with felony offenses); Douglas v. California,372 U. S. 353 (1963) (counsel for direct appeals as of right). 24 THE CHIEF JUSTCE contends that Title II cannot be understood as remedial legislation because it "subjects a State to liability for failing to make a vast array of special accommodations, without regardfor whether the failure to accommodate results in a constitutionalwrong." Post, at 553 (emphasis in original). But as we have often acknowledged, Congress "is not confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Fourteenth Amendment," and may prohibit "a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text." Kimel, 528 U. S., at 81. Cf. Hibbs, 538 U. S. 721 (upholding the FMLA as valid remedial legislation without regard to whether failure to provide the statutorily mandated 12 weeks' leave results in a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).