Term Limits, Election Deadlines and the Hierarchy of Laws Despite the flexibility afforded by public international law, election postponements may not be clearly provided for or even contemplated in national legal frameworks. Term limits and deadlines for elections are usually built into a country’s legal or constitutional framework, making any postponement legally difficult. Usually this is by design, to make manipulation of political terms difficult and to protect against undemocratic power grabs. International principles allow for election postponements, albeit under limited circumstances, and with strict guardrails in place. Despite this, election postponements may not be clearly provided for or even contemplated in national legal frameworks.” For example, in the United States, there is very little flexibility to postpone general elections at the national level. Legislation requires general elections to take place on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November,18 while the Constitution requires the president to be sworn in on January 20.19 While Congress could in theory amend the law to delay the election, constitutional deadlines for inauguration would only permit very limited delays. Hence, the United States has never postponed a presidential election. Even after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the House voted by way of a simple resolution never to postpone a presidential election because of terrorism, and to ensure that no single individual or agency be given the authority to postpone the date of a presidential election.20 In New Zealand, it is possible to postpone elections, but only with a supermajority. As New Zealand does not have a written Constitution, term limits are set out in the electoral legislation, which provides that general elections must take place every three years. Accordingly, the last possible date for an election in 2020 is November 21. However, these legislative provisions could be amended by a 75 percent parliamentary majority, as occurred once during World War I and twice during World War II. Occasionally, legal frameworks may provide some flexibility around setting or moving election dates. For example, the Bougainville Constitution provides that “where in this Constitution a time limit is imposed for the doing of an act … and in a particular case it is not practicable to comply with that limitation, the period shall be deemed to be extended by whatever period is necessary to make compliance practicable.”21 While it is important to ensure that miscellaneous provisions are not used to manipulate elections, this example does illustrate the fact that there may be provisions in the legal frameworks of countries that are outside the electoral laws and the emergency laws, but may be relevant to resolving potential conflicts between the two or filling any lacunae in the law. Countries sometimes have clauses in their constitutions or electoral legal frameworks allowing for the postponement of elections due to emergency situations. Many countries have already relied on such clauses to postpone elections or referendums due to COVID-19, including Chile, France, Serbia and Sri Lanka. Emergency clauses found specifically within electoral laws rather than as part of broader emergency powers are generally contemplated for unforeseen short-term or localized disruptions to elections: for example, due to natural disaster or violence. Depending on how these provisions are framed, and the timing of a country’s election, it is possible such provisions could be applied to the current pandemic situation. In New Zealand, for example, the chief electoral officer can adjourn voting for up to three days, and then subsequently for recurring seven-day periods.22 These provisions in the law seem designed as a last resort to respond to an unforeseen event. However, conceivably they could also be invoked when the disruption is known prior to the start of the election process, as one -8- International Foundation for Electoral Systems