ORLOVSKAYA ISKRA v. RUSSIA JUDGMENT 31 present case relates to the applicant organisation’s exercise of freedom to impart information and ideas. 97. The Court’s task in the present case is to assess whether the interference thus defined was compatible with the Convention. This interference will be in breach of Article 10 of the Convention unless it is “prescribed by law”, pursued one or more legitimate aims listed in Article 10 § 2, and was “necessary in a democratic society”. (b) Lawfulness 98. The Court reiterates that the expression “prescribed by law” in the second paragraph of Article 10 requires that the impugned measure should have a legal basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, which should be accessible to the person concerned and foreseeable as to its effects (see, among other authorities, Rotaru v. Romania [GC], no. 28341/95, § 52, ECHR 2000-V, and Maestri v. Italy [GC], no. 39748/98, § 30, ECHR 2004-I). The level of precision required of domestic legislation – which cannot provide for every eventuality – depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover, and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed (see Centro Europa 7 S.r.l. and Di Stefano v. Italy [GC], no. 38433/09, § 142, ECHR 2012). The applicant organisation’s conviction had its basis in Article 5.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences taken in conjunction with sections 45 and 52 of the Electoral Rights Act of 2002 and section 55 of the State Duma Deputies Election Act of 2005. The applicant organisation mentioned the ambiguity of the notion of “campaigning” as distinguished from the notion of “information for voters”. The Court does not find it necessary in the present case to take any stance on the question of lawfulness, in view of its conclusion below regarding proportionality (see paragraph 134 below). In any event, it will take up the relevant matters below in the context of an analysis of proportionality, in particular as regards the classification of the impugned publications as “campaigning material” and the related administrative offence proceedings against the applicant organisation. (c) Legitimate aim(s) 99. Next, the Court has to ascertain whether the “interference” complained of pursued a legitimate aim. It appears to be common ground between the parties that the “interference” in respect of the applicant organisation’s freedom of expression was aimed to pursue the legitimate aim of protecting the “rights of others”. The Government contended that the “others” in question were other candidates who respected the rules, and voters who might be misled if it were not clear who had sponsored campaigning activities (see paragraph 89 above).