SITAROPOULOS AND GIAKOUMOPOULOS v. GREECE JUDGMENT 21 of the people”. Subject to that reservation, it does not create any “obligation to introduce a specific system” such as proportional representation or majority voting with one or two ballots (see Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 54). 66. There are numerous ways of organising and running electoral systems and a wealth of differences, inter alia, in historical development, cultural diversity and political thought within Europe which it is for each Contracting State to mould into its own democratic vision (see Hirst v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) [GC], no. 74025/01, § 61, ECHR 2005-IX). For the purposes of applying Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, any electoral legislation must be assessed in the light of the political evolution of the country concerned, so that features that would be unacceptable in the context of one system may be justified in the context of another, at least so long as the chosen system provides for conditions which will ensure the “free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature” (see Yumak and Sadak v. Turkey [GC], no. 10226/03, § 111, ECHR 2008). Furthermore, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to any emerging consensus as to the standards to be achieved. In this regard, one of the relevant factors in determining the scope of the authorities’ margin of appreciation may be the existence or non-existence of common ground between the laws of the Contracting States (see Glor v. Switzerland, no. 13444/04, § 75, ECHR 2009). 67. It should also be noted that, in the context of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, the primary obligation is not one of abstention or non-interference, as with the majority of civil and political rights, but one of adoption by the State of positive measures to “hold” democratic elections (see MathieuMohin and Clerfayt, cited above, § 50). In this regard the Court also takes into consideration the fact that the right to vote, the “active” element of the rights under Article 3 of Protocol No. 1, is not a privilege. In the twentyfirst century, the presumption in a democratic State must be in favour of inclusion (see Hirst, cited above, § 59). 68. Accordingly, the exclusion from the right to vote of any groups or categories of the general population must be reconcilable with the underlying purposes of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Ždanoka, cited above, § 105). The Court has held, inter alia, that domestic legislation making the right to vote subject to a minimum age or to residence conditions is, in principle, compatible with Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 (see Hirst, § 62, and Hilbe, both cited above). It has acknowledged that any general, automatic and indiscriminate departure from the principle of universal suffrage risks undermining the democratic validity of the legislature thus elected and the laws it promulgates (see Hirst, cited above).