IFES Practitioner Brief on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Elections challenges: Their operation is not consistent across the country, with some meeting regularly, others only when a complaint is presented, due to lack of funding. Another challenge is that the MPLCs do not have a legal basis; they are established as an administrative arrangement by the Malawi Election Commission (MEC). As such, they do not have clear jurisdiction and procedures but act only on referrals from the MEC. The mechanism could be strengthened by new regulations and by greater liaison with and support from the national level body, the National Elections Consultative Forum, chaired and organized by the MEC, which mirrors the composition of the MPLCs at the national level. Lesson 2: The ADR mandate of an institution, and procedures used for ADR, should be clear and set in advance of elections The legal or regulatory framework for elections needs to set out clear rules, procedures, and defined mandates for any ADR mechanisms. Otherwise, there is a risk of inconsistency, overlapping jurisdiction, and confusion between ADR and EDR. It is also crucial that the laws and regulations provide for the right of appeal to a court or tribunal following the ADR resolution. An expert on ADR in Africa wrote, “[L]egislation will elevate the status of ADR before a sceptical disputant, will build public confidence, and will further increase ADR utilisation and promote ethical practice. Legislation will also provide a framework for reference, review, and reform, as well as institutionalizing much needed education and professional training.” 69 It is also important that rules are published early in the process, giving time for all stakeholders to familiarize themselves with the process, to train or educate their networks, and to enable the EMB to provide public education. Kenya and Sri Lanka are good examples of the need to establish rules in advance for non-binding and decentralized ADR mechanisms. While Peace Committees are provided for in the Kenyan Electoral Law to deal with disputes over the Code of Conduct, to date these mechanisms have not been set up with a clear mandate or procedures and have remained largely inoperative. The Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) established Peace Committees in each constituency for the 2013 elections, to be chaired by returning officers. However, no specific rules were issued by the IEBC to govern the role, responsibilities, and functioning of the committees. This gap was not remedied for the 2017 elections. There were reports from both the 2013 and 2017 elections that the committees were set up in inconsistent ways, sometimes led by the returning officers, but sometimes usurped by county officials. There were no records of cases handled or decisions made, although sanctions were sometimes imposed—which is not the role of mediation. Clear regulation is crucial to avoid inconsistent resolution of disputes and potential abuse of authority, which could increase political tensions ahead of elections. In 2022, the IEBC adopted rules of procedure for its Election Dispute Resolution committee but did not issue specific guidelines for the Peace Committees, which could serve as a first avenue for addressing disputes over alleged Code of Conduct infractions. The mechanisms did not prevent any appeal before a court or a quasi-judicial body if mediation or conciliation failed. As in Kenya, the Sri Lankan Election Commission (EC) established Complaints Management Centers as a decentralized ADR mechanism to complement the formal judicial process. The Complaints Management Centers received disputes for the first time in the 2015 elections and have enjoyed some success as a quick and decentralized 69 Uwazie, E. (Ed.). (2014). Alternative dispute resolution and peace-building in Africa. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 31