IFES Practitioner Brief on Alternative Dispute Resolution in Elections Decentralizing election dispute resolution to have more local ownership and oversight, by directly linking the community to the EMB’s EDR process, could also further the practical objectives of ADR mechanisms in elections. During the 2017 elections, the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN) established ad hoc EDR committees charged with issuing recommendations on alleged violations of the code of conduct to the commission. In addition, the ECN established a local-level code of conduct and campaign finance monitoring committees for the election. Both ADR mechanisms lack guidelines, training, and a clear mandate, and there is inconsistent practice, thereby blurring distinctions between monitoring, settlement, and adjudication of violations. The ECN could consider clarifying the mandate and functions of the ad hoc EDR committees, the local election officials, and the monitoring committees— to merge their roles or establish mediation committees with a clear mandate. Lesson 4: Multi-stakeholder coordination, led by the EMB, can help prevent conflict and fight impunity Effective coordination among different agencies or actors responsible for electoral dispute prevention and resolution can play a positive role in reducing conflict and violence, thereby supporting the credibility of the elections. During several recent elections, the EMB (the TSE) in Guatemala has led an Inter-Institutional Technical Working Group on Election Security. The working group brings together various public bodies to monitor, map, prevent, and resolve electoral conflicts. TSE inspectors at the national, departmental, and municipal levels are trained and take on a coordination role in the working group, working with TSE structures at all levels, the police, prosecutors, security forces, and other government agencies. Together, they monitor and map the risks of electoral conflicts, using information from their on-the-ground presence, media monitoring, and tracking where violations of the electoral law are alleged to have taken place. Through their coordination, the inspectors ensure the appropriate bodies are tasked as necessary. They seek to resolve conflicts before they become formal complaints that go through the established EDR system handled by TSE, thus it reduces the burden on the TSE as disputes are resolved at the local level. The multi-agency coordination has also helped tackle impunity for electoral crimes by quickly passing relevant cases to specialist electoral prosecutors. El Salvador provides another example of cooperation between the EMB and the Attorney General’s Office to address voting and counting disputes. The composition of ADR mechanisms need not involve only state actors but can also involve representatives of political parties and civil society, as they may be selected as members of ADR mechanisms. Such diverse composition requires cooperation, in particular, to ensure timely appointment and training of members. As in several other African countries, Malawi has a culture of community-level ADR mechanisms rooted in its traditional institutions. This led to the formal requirement in the Malawi Constitution to adopt and implement mechanisms for settling disputes through negotiation, good offices, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration. The commitment to ADR is reflected in the election context in the role of MPLCs. The MPLCs, made up of local stakeholders, including political parties, local authorities, civil society, and traditional leaders, can resolve disputes early and effectively, and they have gained the trust of stakeholders. They have succeeded in reducing the burden of pre-election disputes, mainly inter-party conflicts, for both the MEC and the courts. But, to be efficient, they need to be operational quickly. 35