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Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Syllabus ble to the parents. Absent a more convincing case of the claimed evil, this interest is simply too attenuated for § 318 to withstand heightened scrutiny. See Shrink Missouri, 528 U. S., at 391. Even assuming, arguendo, the Government advances an important interest, the provision is overinclusive, as shown by the States' adoption of more tailored approaches. Pp. 231-232. 4. Because the FEC clearly has standing, the Court need not address whether the intervenor-defendants, whose position here is identical to the FEC's, were properly granted intervention pursuant to, inter alia, BCRA §403(b). See, e. g., Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U. S. '417, 431-432, n. 19. P. 233. JUSTICE BREYER delivered the Court's opinion with respect to BCRA Title V-§ 504 of which amends the Communications Act of 1934 to require broadcasters to keep publicly available records of politically related broadcasting requests, 47 U.S. C. § 315(e)--concluding that the portion of the judgment below invalidating §504 as facially violative of the First Amendment must be reversed. Pp. 233-245. 1. Section 504's "candidate request" requirements-which call for broadcasters to keep records of broadcast requests "made by or on behalf of a ... candidate," 47 U. S. C. §315(e)(1)(A)-are upheld. They are virtually identical to those contained in a longstanding Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulation. The McConnell plaintiffs' argument that the requirements are intolerably burdensome and invasive is rejected. The FCC has consistently estimated that its regulation imposes upon a licensee a comparatively small additional administrative burden. Moreover, the §504 requirement is supported by significant governmental interests in verifying that licensees comply with their obligations to allow political candidates "equal time," 47 U. S. C. §315(a), and to sell such time at the "lowest unit charge," § 315(b); in evaluating whether they are processing candidate requests in an evenhanded fashion to help assure broadcasting fairness, § 315(a); in making the public aware of how much candidates spend on broadcast messages, 2 U. S. C. § 434; and in providing an independently compiled set of data for verifying candidates' compliance with BCRA's and FECA's disclosure requirements and source limitations, ibid. Because the Court cannot, on the present record, find the longstanding FCC regulation unconstitutional, it cannot strike down BCRA § 504's "candidate request" provision, which simply embodies the regulation in a statute, thereby blocking any agency attempt to repeal it. Pp. 234-238. 2. Because § 504's "candidate request" requirements are constitutional, its "election message" requirements-which serve similar governmental interests and impose only a small incremental burden in requiring broadcasters to keep records of requests (made by anyone) to broadcast

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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the two principal features of Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) — (1) the soft-money ban on national, state, and local political parties (Title I), and (2) the regulation of electioneering communications by corporations and unions, including disclosure requirements (Title II) — violated the First Amendment's protections of free speech and association. Subsidiary issues included whether BCRA exceeded Congress's Elections Clause authority, violated principles of federalism, violated equal protection by treating political parties differently from interest groups, and whether specific provisions (including the ban on contributions by minors, the "choice" provision requiring parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures, and various disclosure requirements) were constitutional.

Alleged Acts: In 2002, Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), the most significant campaign finance legislation since the 1974 FECA amendments. BCRA responded to three developments that Congress identified as undermining the campaign finance regulatory framework established by FECA and upheld in Buckley v. Valeo. First, political parties exploited a loophole by raising unlimited "soft money" (funds not subject to FECA's source, amount, or disclosure restrictions) for mixed-purpose activities — including get-out-the-vote drives, generic party advertising, and legislative advocacy ads mentioning federal candidates — so long as the ads did not "expressly advocate" a candidate's election or defeat. Second, corporations, unions, and outside groups ran broadcast advertisements that were specifically intended to influence federal elections but avoided FECA's restrictions by eschewing "magic words" of express advocacy (e.g., "vote for," "defeat"), instead purporting to discuss "issues" while clearly targeting candidates. The statute's principal features were Title I, which regulated soft money by banning national party committees from raising or spending non-federal funds (§323(a)), restricting state and local parties from using soft money for "federal election activity" (§323(b)), restricting solicitations by party committees on behalf of tax-exempt organizations (§323(d)), and limiting federal candidates' and officeholders' solicitation of soft money (§323(e)); and Title II, which prohibited corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for "electioneering communications" — broadcast ads aired within 30 days of a primary or 60 days of a general election that refer to a clearly identified federal candidate (§203, amending FECA §316(b)(2)) — and imposed disclosure requirements on persons funding such communications (§201, amending FECA §304).

Procedural history: A three-judge panel issued a lengthy per curiam opinion that split on numerous provisions. The panel (Judges Kollar-Kotelly, Leon, and Henderson) upheld some parts of BCRA and struck down others.

Summary: McConnell v. FEC was the most comprehensive campaign finance decision since Buckley v. Valeo (1976). The Supreme Court largely upheld the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002, including its two principal features: (1) the soft-money ban prohibiting national, state, and local political parties from raising and spending unregulated funds for federal election activities (Title I), and (2) the regulation of "electioneering communications" — broadcast ads aired within 30/60 days of an election referring to a federal candidate — including the prohibition on corporate and union treasury funds and the disclosure requirements (Title II). The Court applied the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard for contribution limits and found that the government's interest in preventing corruption and its appearance — extending beyond quid pro quo exchanges to "undue influence" — justified the soft-money restrictions. Critically, the Court rejected the argument that Buckley had established a constitutionally mandated line between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy," holding instead that the "magic words" test was merely a product of statutory interpretation adopted to avoid vagueness concerns, and that BCRA's more precise definition of "electioneering communication" was constitutional. The Court struck down only two provisions: the "choice" provision requiring parties to choose between coordinated and independent expenditures (§213), and the ban on contributions by minors (§318). The decision represented the high-water mark of campaign finance regulation and was later significantly narrowed by FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life (2007), which established the "as-applied" challenge standard for electioneering communications, and Citizens United v. FEC (2010), which struck down the corporate/union treasury fund prohibition as applied to independent expenditures.

Conclusion: In a complex, multi-part opinion, the Supreme Court largely upheld BCRA — affirming the district court in part and reversing in part. The Court upheld the ban on national party committees soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending soft money, applying the "closely drawn" scrutiny standard for contribution limits under Buckley. The Court found that the governmental interest in preventing actual or apparent corruption extended beyond quid pro quo exchanges to "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence." The record was "replete with examples of national party committees peddling access to federal candidates and officeholders in exchange for large soft-money donations." The Court upheld restrictions on state and local parties using soft money for "Federal election activity" (voter registration, GOTV, generic campaign activity, public communications referring to federal candidates, and employee time). Congress reasonably predicted that donors would redirect soft money to state committees after §323(a), and preventing that shift qualified as an important governmental interest. The Levin Amendment — allowing state and local committees to use a mix of hard money and "Levin funds" (subject to state regulation and a $10,000/year contribution cap) for certain activities — was also upheld. The Court upheld the restriction on party committees soliciting funds for or making donations to §501(c) tax-exempt organizations and §527 political organizations engaged in federal election activities, as a valid anti-circumvention measure. The Court narrowly construed the "donations" ban to apply only to soft-money donations, not to funds already raised in compliance with FECA. The Court upheld the ban on federal candidates and officeholders soliciting, receiving, directing, transferring, or spending soft money in connection with federal elections, as well as the limits on their soft-money activities for state and local elections. The Court rejected plaintiffs' arguments that Title I exceeded Congress's Elections Clause authority or violated the Tenth Amendment, holding that Title I regulates private parties' conduct, imposes no requirements on state officials, and leaves states free to enforce their own restrictions. The Court rejected the argument that BCRA discriminated against political parties in favor of interest groups, noting that BCRA actually favors parties in many ways and that Congress may consider the "salient, real-world differences between parties and interest groups." The Court rejected plaintiffs' argument that Buckley established a constitutionally mandated line between "express advocacy" and "issue advocacy." The Court held that the express advocacy limitation was a product of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional command — it was adopted to avoid vagueness concerns with the specific statutory language at issue in Buckley. BCRA's definition of "electioneering communication" (broadcast ads within 30/60 days of an election referring to a clearly identified candidate) was held to be both easily understood and objectively determinable, so the vagueness concern was inapposite.

Legal Issue(s)

Campaign Finance

Applicable Law(s): Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, Federal Election Campaign Act, First Amendment, Tenth Amendment, and Article 1, Section 4 (Elections Clause) of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Dec 10, 2003

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep540/usrep540093/usrep540093.pdf

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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission.pdf
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McConnell v. Federal Election Commission

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