Cite as: 540 U. S. 93 (2003) Opinion of the Court ventions; required reporting and public disclosure of contributions and expenditures exceeding certain limits; and established the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the legislation. Id., at 831-834. The Court of Appeals upheld the 1974 amendments almost in their entirety.4 It concluded that the clear and compelling interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process provided a sufficient basis for sustaining the substantive provisions of the Act. Id., at 841. The court's opinion relied heavily on findings that large contributions facilitated access to public officials 5 and described methods of evading the con4 The court held that one disclosure provision was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F. 2d 821, 832 (CADC 1975) (en banc) (per curiam) (invalidating 2 U. S. C. § 437a (1970 ed., Supp. V)). No appeal was taken from that holding. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1, 10, n. 7 (1976) (per curiam). 5 The Court of Appeals found: "Large contributions are intended to, and do, gain access to the elected official after the campaign for consideration of the contributor's particular concerns. Senator Mathias not only describes this but also the corollary, that the feeling that big contributors gain special treatment produces a reaction that the average American has no significant role in the political process." Buckley, 519 F. 2d, at 838 (footnotes omitted). The court also noted: "Congress found and the District Court confirmed that such contributions were often made for the purpose of furthering business or private interests by facilitating access to government officials or influencing governmental decisions, and that, conversely, elected officials have tended to afford special treatment to large contributors. See S. Rep. No. 93-689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5; Findings I, 108, 110, 118, 170." Id., at 838, n. 32. Citing further evidence of corruption, the court explained: "The disclosures of illegal corporate contributions in 1972 included the testimony of executives that they were motivated by the perception that this was necessary as a 'calling card, something that would get us in the door and make our point of view heard,' Hearings before the Senate Select Comm. on PresidentialCampaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5442 (1973) (Ashland Oil Co.-Orin Atkins, Chairman) or 'in response to pressure for fear of a competitive disadvantage that might result,' id. at 5495, 5514 (American Airlines-George Spater, former chairman); see Findings I, 105. The record before Congress was replete with specific examples