INTRODUCTION
Democratic elections that are free and fair have
long been accepted as lying at the heart of
democratic governance. It is through democratic
elections that people rule themselves through their
freely chosen representatives. For this reason,
democratic elections lead to representative
democracy. At the core of democratic elections is
the expression of the will of the people. Whenever
an election is conducted, it is imperative that
electoral management authorities strive to
ensure that the election result is an accurate
representation of the will of those who voted. In
other words, electoral management bodies (EMBs),
within their mandate to organise and manage
regular, free and fair elections, should guarantee
the integrity of the electoral process from its onset
until the declaration of the result. This explains why
there is immense public interest in the preservation
of the integrity of the electoral process and the
declaration of the election result. Where there is
evidence of breaching the integrity of the electoral
process, such a scenario results in politically
charged disagreements. Invariably, disputes
involving the results of an election in Sub-Saharan
Africa stand are determined by a court of law or
tribunal, be it of general or specialised jurisdiction.
IT IS THROUGH
DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS
THAT PEOPLE RULE
THEMSELVES THROUGH
THEIR FREELY CHOSEN
REPRESENTATIVES
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Election petitions are believed to have originated
in England in the House of Commons. This took the
form of a parliamentary inquiry into the substance
of an electoral complaint.1 The House of Commons
was “the sole proper judge” of its members’ returns,
“without which the freedom of the election were
not entire.”2 The inquiry process was adversarial
in nature and devoid of any legal technicalities.
In 1604, the Commons Committee, as the “sole
and proper judge” entrusted with inquiring into
elections petitions, had this to say:
We avouch that the House of Commons is the
sole proper judge of return of all such writs and
of the election of all such members as belong to
it, without which the freedom of election were not
entire: And that the Chancery, though a standing
court under your Majesty, be to send out those writs
and receive the returns and to preserve them, yet
the same is done only for the use of the Parliament,
over which neither the Chancery nor any other court
ever had or ought to have any manner of jurisdiction.3
Around 1868, through the Parliamentary Elections
Act,4 the jurisdiction to adjudicate proceedings
was transferred to courts of law, with little changes
in terms of procedure. This piece of legislation
remains applicable in England to this day.5 The
reasons for this development were many, chief
of which was that “It later became apparent that
partisanship was eroding the credibility of the
House decisions on elections and the ultimate
diminution of public confidence in elections as a
whole.”6 The transition was dramatic. At first, the
judiciary was averse to accepting jurisdiction over
election petitions. The famous and widely quoted
words of the Chief Justice to the Lord Chancellor
on 6 February 1868 deserve direct quotation:7
C O’Leary ‘The Elimination of Corrupt Practices in British Elections’ 1868-1911 (1961) 4.
Recently applied in the case of R (on the application of Philip James Woolas) and The Parliamentary Election Court [2010] EWHC 3169 (Admin).
Woolas Judgment, para 23.
Sometimes known as the Election Petitions and Corrupt Practices at Elections Act, 1868 or Corrupt Practices Act, 1868.
Recently applied in the case of R (on the application of Philip James Woolas) and The Parliamentary Election Court [2010] EWHC 3169 (Admin).
H ‘Nyane, ‘A Critique of Proceduralism in the Adjudication of Electoral Disputes in Lesotho’ (2018) Journal of African Elections 1 at p4.
Woolas Judgment (n 124).
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