2 BRNOVICH v. DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE Syllabus intent” and thus violated both §2 of the VRA and the Fifteenth Amendment. The District Court rejected all of the plaintiffs’ claims. The court found that the out-of-precinct policy had no “meaningfully disparate impact” on minority voters’ opportunities to elect representatives of their choice. Turning to the ballot-collection restriction, the court found that it was unlikely to cause “a meaningful inequality” in minority voters’ electoral opportunities and that it had not been enacted with discriminatory intent. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed, but the en banc court reversed. It first concluded that both the out-of-precinct policy and the ballot-collection restriction imposed a disparate burden on minority voters because they were more likely to be adversely affected by those rules. The en banc court also held that the District Court had committed clear error in finding that the ballot-collection law was not enacted with discriminatory intent. Held: Arizona’s out-of-precinct policy and HB 2023 do not violate §2 of the VRA, and HB 2023 was not enacted with a racially discriminatory purpose. Pp. 12–37. (a) Two threshold matters require the Court’s attention. First, the Court rejects the contention that no petitioner has Article III standing to appeal the decision below as to the out-of-precinct policy. All that is needed to entertain an appeal of that issue is one party with standing. Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 591 U. S. ___, ___, n. 6. Attorney General Brnovich, as an authorized representative of the State (which intervened below) in any action in federal court, fits the bill. See Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, 587 U. S. ___, ___. Second, the Court declines in these cases to announce a test to govern all VRA §2 challenges to rules that specify the time, place, or manner for casting ballots. It is sufficient for present purposes to identify certain guideposts that lead to the Court’s decision in these cases. Pp. 12–13. (b) The Court’s statutory interpretation starts with a careful consideration of the text. Pp. 13–25. (1) The Court first construed the current version of §2 in Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, which was a vote-dilution case where the Court took its cue from §2’s legislative history. The Court’s many subsequent vote-dilution cases have followed the path Gingles charted. Because the Court here considers for the first time how §2 applies to generally applicable time, place, or manner voting rules, it is appropriate to take a fresh look at the statutory text. Pp. 13–14. (2) In 1982, Congress amended the language in §2 that had been interpreted to require proof of discriminatory intent by a plurality of the Court in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55. In place of that language, §2(a) now uses the phrase “in a manner which results in a denial or