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SHAW v. RENO WHITE, J., dissenting a majority-minority district does not unfairly minimize the voting power of any other group, the Constitution does not justify, much less mandate, such obstruction. We said as much in Gaffney: "[C]ourts have [no] constitutional warrant to invalidate a state plan, otherwise within tolerable population limits, because it undertakes, not to minimize or eliminate the political strength of any group or party, but to recognize it and, through districting, provide a rough sort of proportional representation in the legislative halls of the State." 412 U. S., at 754. III Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. I have no doubt that a State's compliance with the Voting Rights Act clearly constitutes a compelling interest. Cf. UJO, 430 U. S., at 162165 (opinion of WHITE, J.); id., at 175-179 (Brennan, J., concurring in part); id., at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). Here, the Attorney General objected to the State's plan on the ground that it failed to draw a second majority-minority district for what appeared to be pretextual reasons. Rather than challenge this conclusion, North Carolina chose to draw the second district. As UJO held, a State is entitled to take such action. See also Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U. S.267, 291 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). The Court, while seemingly agreeing with this position, warns that the State's redistricting effort must be "narrowly tailored" to further its interest in complying with the law. Ante, at 658. It is evident to me, however, that what North Carolina did was precisely tailored to meet the objection of the Attorney General to its prior plan. Hence, I see no need

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Shaw v. Reno

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff may state a cognizable claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that a legislature, though race-neutral on its face, drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race — and whether such a racial gerrymander, even without proof of vote dilution, triggers strict scrutiny as a racial classification.

Alleged Acts: As a result of the 1990 census, North Carolina became entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives. The state's voting-age population was approximately 78% white, 20% Black, and 1% Native American. The Black population was relatively dispersed, constituting a majority in only 5 of the state's 100 counties, with the largest concentrations in the northern Coastal Plain region. The North Carolina General Assembly first enacted a reapportionment plan containing one majority-Black congressional district centered in that area. However, forty of North Carolina's 100 counties were covered by Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, requiring federal preclearance. The U.S. Attorney General objected to the plan, concluding that it appeared to dilute minority voting strength in violation of Section 5. In response, the General Assembly enacted new legislation creating a second majority-Black district — District 12 — which stretched approximately 160 miles along Interstate 85 in a serpentine shape, sometimes no wider than the highway itself, connecting discrete Black communities from Durham to Gastonia. The resulting district boundaries were of "dramatically irregular shape." A group of white voters, led by Ruth O. Shaw, challenged the revised plan, alleging that it constituted an unconstitutional racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Procedural history: A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate vote dilution or other cognizable injury.

Summary: Shaw v. Reno is a landmark constitutional law decision that created an entirely new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause: the racial gerrymandering claim. The Court held that a plaintiff may challenge a redistricting plan by alleging that the legislature drew district boundaries so bizarrely irregular that they can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race — even without alleging vote dilution. Such racial classifications trigger strict scrutiny, requiring the state to show that its use of race was narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. The decision was grounded in the principle that the state's sorting of voters by race carries a stigmatizing harm that is constitutionally distinct from vote dilution: it reinforces racial stereotypes and sends the message that race defines political identity. Shaw spawned an extensive line of racial gerrymandering cases — including Miller v. Johnson (1995), which shifted the focus from bizarre shape to whether race was the "predominant factor," and Bush v. Vera (1996) — and established the legal framework that continues to govern racial gerrymandering challenges today, including in cases like Cooper v. Harris (2017) and Allen v. Milligan (2023).

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court and held that the plaintiffs had stated a cognizable claim for racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court recognized a new cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering — distinct from vote-dilution claims. The Court held that a plaintiff may state a claim by alleging that a reapportionment plan, though race-neutral on its face, is so "bizarre" or "irrational" in shape that it can only be understood as an effort to separate voters by race. The Court held that redistricting legislation that classifies voters on the basis of race is subject to strict scrutiny, the same standard applied to all racial classifications by the state. The state must show that its use of race is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. The Court emphasized the dramatically irregular shape of North Carolina's District 12 — a 160-mile serpentine corridor along Interstate 85 — as evidence that the legislature had used race as the predominant factor. The Court distinguished Shaw claims from ordinary political gerrymandering by the extreme irregularity of the district boundaries, which defied traditional districting principles. The Court held that the harm in a racial gerrymandering claim is not limited to the dilution of votes. The constitutional injury includes the stigmatizing effect of racial sorting by the state, which carries voters "the insidious message that their race defines their political identity" and reinforces "racial stereotypes and the perception that members of the same racial group think alike and share the same political interests.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965 and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 28, 1993

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://tile.loc.gov/storage-services/service/ll/usrep/usrep509/usrep509630/usrep509630.pdf

Primary Documents

Shaw v. Reno.pdf
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Election Judgments - IFES

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Shaw v. Reno

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