CAAMAÑO VALLE v. SPAIN JUDGMENT have the legal capacity and ability to act, except in cases where the degree of disability is such that it prevents them from caring for themselves. Accordingly, those who suffer from a mental illness that prevents them from caring for themselves may be declared incapable and placed under the guardianship of a tutor or a curator (see paragraph 17 above). However, guardianship does not automatically lead to disenfranchisement. 67. At the time of the events in question, Spanish law provided for the deprivation of the right to vote only in respect of the most serious cases of disability and in respect of persons ruled incapacitated by a final judicial decision (always revisable according to the personal circumstances) declaring specifically that the person in question was incapable of exercising the right to vote (see paragraph 18 above). 68. The Court notes that Spain in 2018 eliminated the possibility of restricting disabled people’s right to vote (see paragraph 19 above). This means that the applicant’s daughter has been entitled to exercise her right to vote since the entry into force of the Law 2/2018 amending the LOREG. Nevertheless, the fact that the law was amended in 2018 in such a way as to return voting rights to all persons with a mental disability, without exception, does not imply that the previous system was incompatible with the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1. 69. The Court reiterates that in respect of the restriction of the rights of mentally disabled persons the margin of appreciation is relatively narrow (see paragraph 55 above); an individualised judicial evaluation of the cognitive capacity is therefore required, and it must be demonstrated that the limitation is not solely based on a mental disability necessitating partial guardianship (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 44). 70. The Court will therefore examine whether the domestic courts thoroughly examined the justification of the limitation of the daughter’s rights, in the light of the Convention principles. 71. As indicated above, the applicant’s daughter did not lose her right to vote as the result of the imposition of an automatic, blanket restriction on the franchise of those under guardianship but as the result of an explicit decision taken in the course of separate incapacity proceedings that were initiated at the request of her parents (contrast Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 43). The Court notes that those proceedings were initiated in December 2013 (shortly before M. reached the age of 18) after her parents lodged an application for her to be deprived of her legal capacity and for their guardianship over her to be extended. Her parents initiated the proceedings because they were aware that their daughter had serious problems that rendered her unable to manage her life on her own. 72. As noted above, four different judicial bodies were involved in the assessment of the “fitness to vote” (see Alajos Kiss, cited above, § 41) of the applicant’s daughter. The First-Instance Judge examined the applicant’s daughter’s legal capacity in depth and – after weighing the interests at stake 22