10 HMA 36-18 HC 263/18 going. Thns each one of them gave rise to a cause of action. Practically, it would have taken time to put it all together. That was Mr Co/tart's explanation. It made sense. [25] I considered that any breach of the rights accorded by the Constitution should not be allowed to subsist for any day longer. The conrts would be failing in their constitutional duty if they were to remain unmoved in the face of reports of such flagrant abuse. They cannot carry on with 'business as usual'. They should be so concerned as to set aside all other business in order to deal with the situation. That is the essence of an urgent chamber application. Therefore, I once again dismissed the argument that the matter was not urgent. [26] The first respondent's last point in limine was that the draft order was defective in that the interim relief sought was almost identical to the final order prayed for. The argument was that the applicants were seeking a final remedy on an urgent basis and that if the interim relief was granted there would be no need for a retum day. [27] Again the dichotomy between an interim relief and a final order in an urgent chamber application is a well-trodden path. It has been stated time and again that the object of an urgent chamber application is to get interim protection. Because of the urgency that may be manifest on the papers, the application is allowed to jump the queue of cases awaiting determination at the comts. But the issues are not intenogated to any great depth. As long as an applicant shows a prima facie right, even ifthis be open to some doubt; a well-grounded apprehension of an irreparable harm; that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an interim interdict; that there is no other satisfactory remedy; and that there are reasonable prospects of success in the merits of the main case, the applicant should be entitled to relief. [28] lnKuvarega above, CHATIKOBO J said: "The practice of seeking interim relief which is exactly the same as the substantive relief sued for, and which has the same effect, defeats the whole object of interim protection. In effect a litigant who seeks relief in this manner obtains final relief without proving his case. That is so because interim relief is nmmally granted on the mere showing of a prima facie case. If the interim relief is identical to the main relief and has the same substantive effect, it means that the applicant is granted the main relief on proof merely of a prima facie case. This, to my mind,