7 HMA 36-18 HC 263/18 have dismissed an application for want of form it is usually because the application would have been accompanied by neither Form 29B nor Form 29, but by something else completely alien to the Rules. This was not the case with the applicants' application herein. Therefore, I condoned their use of Form 29B, or their failure to modify Form 29. [15] Furthermore, and at any rate, in terms of r 229C, the use of one form instead of another, i.e. of Form 29B instead of Form 29, does not in itself constitute sufficient grounds for dismissing an application. It is necessary for a court or judge to conclude that an interested party has thereby suffeted prejudice. In casu, Mr Mushangwe, for the first respondent, had no choice but to concede that the first respondent had suffered no discernible prejudice by the applicants' use of Form 29B, instead of Form 29. Among other things, the first respondent had filed an elaborate notice of opposition and eloquently placed its case before the court. [16] The first respondent's second ground of objection was that the certificate of urgency was palpably defective in that it was bereft of essential avetments and replete with typo graphical enors. [17] A certificate of urgency is the sine quo non for an application being heard on an urgent basis: see General Transport & Engineering [Pvt} Ltd & Ors v Zimbabwe Banking Corporation [Pvt] Ltd'; Chidawu & Ors v Shah & Ors 8 ; UZ- UCSF Collaborative Research Programme v Husaiwevhu and Ors 9 and Odar Housing Development Consortium v Sensene Investments [Pvt] Ltd & Ors 10 . As an officer of the court, a legal practitioner, having carefully applied his mind to the matter, certifies it to be one of urgency. Even though the judge eventually dealing with the matter has to decide whether or not it is urgent, he is entitled, in the initial instance, to rely on the opinion of the legal practitioner. 7 1998 (2) ZLR 301 (H) 8 sc 12-13 9 HH 260-14 HH 709/15 10