Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
5
Opinion of the Court
therefore raises “special challenges” for plaintiffs. Cooper,
581 U. S., at 308. To prevail, a plaintiff must “disentangle
race from politics” by proving “that the former drove a district’s lines.” Ibid. (emphasis added). That means, among
other things, ruling out the competing explanation that political considerations dominated the legislature’s redistricting efforts. If either politics or race could explain a district’s
contours, the plaintiff has not cleared its bar.
Our decision in Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234 (2001)
(Cromartie II ), illustrates the difficulties that plaintiffs
must overcome in this context. There, the plaintiffs’ case
hinged on circumstantial evidence of a racial gerrymander
such as expert testimony and discrepancies between the relevant district lines and traditional districting criteria. Id.,
at 240–241; see also Cooper, 581 U. S., at 321 (describing
the direct evidence in Cromartie II as “extremely weak”).
After the State asserted a partisan-gerrymandering defense, we faulted the plaintiffs for failing to show “that the
legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in alternative ways that are comparably consistent
with traditional districting principles.” Cromartie II, 532
U. S., at 258. In other words, the plaintiffs failed to meet
the high bar for a racial-gerrymandering claim by failing to
produce, among other things, an alternative map showing
that a rational legislature sincerely driven by its professed
partisan goals would have drawn a different map with
greater racial balance. Since our decision in Cromartie II,
any plaintiff with a strong case has had every incentive to
produce such an alternative map.
Without an alternative map, it is difficult for plaintiffs to
defeat our starting presumption that the legislature acted
in good faith. This presumption of legislative good faith directs district courts to draw the inference that cuts in the
legislature’s favor when confronted with evidence that
could plausibly support multiple conclusions. See, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 610–612 (2018). This approach