Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
13
Opinion of the Court
Miller, 515 U. S., at 916. In this case, the District Court
clearly erred because the Challengers did not meet this “demanding” standard. Id., at 928 (O’CONNOR, J., concurring).
They provided no direct evidence of a racial gerrymander,
and their circumstantial evidence is very weak. Instead,
the Challengers relied on deeply flawed expert reports. And
while these experts produced tens of thousands of maps
with differently configured districts, they did not offer a single map that achieved the legislature’s partisan goal while
including a higher BVAP in District 1. Faced with this record, we must reverse the District Court on the racial-gerrymandering claim.
We divide our analysis into four parts. First, we set out
the appropriate legal standard for reviewing a district
court’s factual findings in racial-gerrymandering cases.
Second, we explain why the District Court’s factual findings
are clearly flawed with respect to the Challengers’ circumstantial evidence. Third, we examine the four expert reports that the Challengers presented below. And finally,
we explain that the District Court erred by not drawing an
adverse inference from the Challengers’ failure to submit
an alternative map that would have allowed the State to
achieve its districting goals while maintaining a higher
BVAP in District 1.
A
We review the District Court’s factual findings for clear
error. That means we may not set those findings aside unless, after examining the entire record, we are “left with the
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Cooper, 581 U. S., at 309 (internal quotation
marks omitted). This is a demanding test, but it is not a
rubber stamp.
Moreover, in a case like this, there is a special danger
that a misunderstanding of what the law requires may in-