Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024) 9 THOMAS, J., concurring in part zoomed-out maps that include no information about precinct size or location. Post, at 35, Appendix. This type of back-and-forth is the inevitable result of our voting-rights doctrine. One worries that the Court will soon begin drawing its own sample maps and performing in-house regression analyses. A system in which only specialized experts can discern the existence of a constitutional injury is intolerable, and strongly suggests that the racial gerrymandering injury is not amenable to judicial resolution. We should resist the temptation to reduce the Fourteenth Amendment to a battle of expert witnesses. Our gerrymandering misadventures demonstrate that these claims lack judicially manageable standards. 2 As I have long maintained, vote dilution claims are also “not readily subjected to any judicially manageable standards.” Holder v. Hall, 512 U. S. 874, 901–902 (1994) (THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment). To prove vote dilution as a constitutional claim, our precedents require plaintiffs to show that the design of a district reduces “minority voters’ ability, as a group, to elect the candidate of their choice.” Shaw, 509 U. S., at 641 (internal quotation marks omitted). The same consideration is used for vote dilution claims brought under §2 of the Voting Rights Act. See Allen, 599 U. S., at 13 (explaining that §2 “borrow[s] language from a Fourteenth Amendment [vote dilution] case”). To assess whether a legislature has diluted a minority’s vote, “the critical question . . . is: ‘Diluted relative to what benchmark?’ ” Id., at 50 (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (quoting Gonzalez v. Aurora, 535 F. 3d 594, 598 (CA7 2008) (Easterbrook, C. J.)). Despite repeated efforts in our Voting Rights Act cases, the Court has “never succeeded” in formulating “an objective and workable method of identifying the undiluted benchmark.” 599 U. S., at 69 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).