12 ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF THE NAACP THOMAS, J., concurring in part Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.” Art. I, §4, cl. 1. The first part of the Clause “imposes a duty upon” state legislatures to “prescribe the details necessary to hold congressional elections.” U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779, 862 (1995) (THOMAS, J., dissenting). The second part “grants power exclusively to Congress” to police the state legislatures’ performance of their duty. Id., at 864. Critically, the Clause leaves the Judiciary out of the districting process entirely. The Clause’s assignment of roles is comprehensive. For example, a state legislature’s responsibility over congressional elections “ ‘transcends any limitations sought to be imposed by the people of a State’ ” through other state actors; the state legislature is the exclusive state authority. Moore v. Harper, 600 U. S. 1, 58 (2023) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (quoting Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130, 137 (1922)). In a similar vein, the Clause makes Congress the exclusive federal authority over States’ efforts to draw congressional districts, to the exclusion of courts. The historical record compels this interpretation of the Elections Clause’s text. Gerrymandering and vote dilution are not new phenomena. The founding generation was familiar with political districting problems from the American colonial experience. See Vieth, 541 U. S., at 274 (collecting examples). But, the Framers nowhere suggested the federal courts as a potential solution to those problems. Instead, they relied on congressional oversight. The Framers’ considered choice of a nonjudicial remedy is highly relevant context to the interpretation of the Elections Clause. See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U. S. 1, 26–27 (2022). Because the Elections Clause attracted considerable criticism during the ratification debates, ample contemporaneous discussion sheds light on the original understanding of