Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
17
THOMAS, J., concurring in part
voting-rights violations in §2 counsels against reading §1 to
allow judicial remedies implicitly in those same votingrights disputes. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533, 594
(1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Reading the Equal Protection Clause to support claims
for racial gerrymandering or vote dilution also makes the
existence of the Fifteenth Amendment unexplainable. If §1
of the Fourteenth Amendment allows for such fulsome protection of the franchise by federal courts, it is hard to see
why “Congress and the States still found it necessary to
adopt the Fifteenth Amendment—which protects ‘[t]he
right of citizens of the United States to vote’—two years after the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage.” McDonald, 561
U. S., at 852 (opinion of THOMAS, J.).
Nor can the Fifteenth Amendment justify racial gerrymandering or vote dilution claims in its own right. The Fifteenth Amendment is the primary constitutional protection
for the voting rights of racial minorities. But, the Fifteenth
Amendment “address[es] only matters relating to access to
the ballot.” Holder, 512 U. S., at 930 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.). “[I]ts protections [are] satisfied as long as members of
racial minorities [can] ‘ “register and vote without hindrance.” ’ ” Id., at 921 (quoting Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S.
55, 65 (1980) (plurality opinion)). The Court’s decision in
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960)—a Fifteenth
Amendment case often cited as a touchstone of our racial
gerrymandering jurisprudence—is consistent with this understanding. Gomillion involved only a claim “that the
boundaries of a city had been drawn to prevent blacks from
voting in municipal elections altogether,” not a claim about
the way minority voters were distributed between two districts. Holder, 512 U. S., at 920, n. 20 (opinion of THOMAS,
J.).
At this juncture, I see no directive in the Reconstruction
Amendments for courts to police the lines between political