18
ALEXANDER v. SOUTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE
OF THE NAACP
THOMAS, J., concurring in part
districts. Instead, the Elections Clause assigns the responsibility for supervising the States’ drawing of congressional
districts solely to Congress.
*
*
*
Racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims lack judicially manageable standards for their resolution. And,
they conflict with the Constitution’s textual commitment of
congressional districting issues to the state legislatures and
Congress. They therefore present nonjusticiable political
questions. The Court should extricate itself from this business and return political districting to the political
branches, where it belongs.
II
When an institution strays from its competencies, one
does not expect good results. This Court’s efforts in the districting field are no exception. The underlying nonjusticiability of racial gerrymandering and vote dilution claims
leads us to distort our doctrines in numerous ways. The
standard that the Court uses to resolve racial gerrymandering claims betrays the colorblind promise of the Fourteenth
Amendment by endorsing the notion that some racial classifications are benign. The standard that the Court uses to
resolve vote dilution claims invariably falls back on racial
stereotypes. And, the remedy commonly ordered in redistricting cases—a judicially imposed map—ignores the normal limits on federal equity power. Taken together, the
Court’s misconceived doctrines leave the States in an unenviable position.
A
The racial predominance standard for racial gerrymandering claims is plainly inconsistent with the fact that
“ ‘[o]ur Constitution is color-blind.’ ” Harvard College, 600
U. S., at 230 (quoting Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (opinion of
Harlan, J.)). Ordinarily, any governmental consideration of