Cite as: 602 U. S. ____ (2024)
5
KAGAN, J., dissenting
it may have done so for no reason other than to achieve partisan gain. And here, that a three-judge court unanimously
found all this to have occurred.
The proper response to this case is not to throw up novel
roadblocks enabling South Carolina to continue dividing
citizens along racial lines. It is to respect the plausible—
no, the more than plausible—findings of the District Court
that the State engaged in race-based districting. And to tell
the State that it must redraw District 1, this time without
targeting African-American citizens.
I
Begin with the law, and more particularly the usual
standard of review. This Court all the time recites the
words: “only for clear error.” Cooper, 581 U. S., at 293, 309.
And those words always mean (or anyway, always meant)
the same thing. Under the clear-error standard, a lower
court’s factual findings “warrant[ ] significant deference.”
Id., at 293. We do not rubber stamp those findings, but we
affirm them so long as they are “plausible” in light of the
full record. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U. S. 564, 574
(1985). And that is so even if, left to our own devices, we
“would have decided the [matter] differently.” Id., at 573.
We can reverse only when “left with the definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Ibid. And
nowhere is that high bar higher than when witness credibility is at issue. A trial court’s judgment about whether a
witness is telling the truth is entitled to “singular deference.” Cooper, 581 U. S., at 309.
The reasons for thus deferring to trial court factfinding
are equally well-settled. Trial courts are the judiciary’s
factfinding specialists. They live with a case for months or
years, supervising discovery, ruling on the admission of expert opinions, and watching how the evidence unfolds.
They preside over the trial and see the live witnesses (24 in