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2 ABBOTT v. PEREZ Syllabus comply with the VRA, Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. ___, ___. The Texas Legislature’s 2011 plans were immediately tied up in litigation and never used. The case was assigned to a three-judge court (Texas court). Texas also submitted the plans for preclearance to the District Court for the District of Columbia (D. C. court). The Texas court drew up interim plans for the State’s rapidly approaching primaries, giving no deference to the Legislature’s plans. Texas challenged the court-ordered plans in this Court, which reversed and remanded with instructions for the Texas court to start with the Texas Legislature’s 2011 plans but to make adjustments as required by the Constitution and the VRA. The Texas court then adopted new interim plans. After the D. C. court denied preclearance of the 2011 plans, Texas used the Texas court’s interim plans for the 2012 elections. In 2013, the Legislature repealed the 2011 plans and enacted the Texas court’s plans (with minor modifications). After Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U. S. 529, was decided, Texas, no longer covered by §5, obtained a vacatur of the D. C. court’s preclearance order. But the Texas court did not dismiss the case against the 2011 plans as moot. Instead, it allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint to challenge the 2013 plans and held that their challenges to the 2011 plans were live. Texas conducted its 2014 and 2016 elections under the 2013 plans. In 2017, the Texas court found defects in several of the districts in the 2011 federal congressional and State House plans (the State Senate plan is not at issue here). Subsequently, it also invalidated multiple Congressional (CD) and House (HD) Districts in the 2013 plans, holding that the Legislature failed to cure the “taint” of discriminatory intent allegedly harbored by the 2011 Legislature. And the court relied on that finding to invalidate several challenged 2013 districts. The court also held that three districts—CD27, HD32, and HD34—were invalid under §2 of the VRA because they had the effect of depriving Latinos of the equal opportunity to elect their candidates of choice. And it found that HD90 was a racial gerrymander based on changes made by the 2013 Legislature. It gave the state attorney general three days to tell the court whether the Legislature would remedy the violations; and if the Legislature did not intend to adopt new plans, the court would hold remedial hearings. Held: 1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the orders at issue. Pp. 11– 21. (a) The Texas court’s orders fall within 28 U. S. C. §1253, which gives the Court jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order of a three-judge district court “granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction.” The Texas court did not call its orders “injunctions,” but where an order has the “practical effect” of granting or

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Abbott v. Perez

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the 2013 Texas congressional and state House redistricting plans violated the Equal Protection Clause (racial gerrymandering), Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (vote dilution), and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (intentional discrimination) — and specifically whether the district court erred by finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans enacted by the Legislature; holding that certain districts were racial gerrymanders where race was the predominant factor; finding Section 2 vote dilution in certain districts where plaintiffs could not demonstrate that an additional compact minority opportunity district was possible; and applying the wrong legal standard in distinguishing between racial motivation and partisan motivation in redistricting.

Alleged Acts: Following the 2010 census, the Texas Legislature enacted new congressional (Plan C185) and state House (Plan H283) redistricting plans. The plans were challenged by various plaintiffs — including individual voters, the Mexican American Legislative Caucus (MALC), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the NAACP, and others — alleging racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and intentional discrimination. Texas was a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and sought preclearance from a D.C. district court. While preclearance was pending, the W.D. Texas district court drew interim plans (Plan C220 for Congress and Plan H309 for the state House) for use in the 2012 elections. The Supreme Court in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012), vacated the interim maps, directing the district court to be more deferential to the elected branches. The interim maps were then revised. After Shelby County v. Holder (2013) effectively ended Section 5 preclearance, the Texas Legislature adopted the court-drawn interim plans (with modifications) as its 2013 plans (Plan C235 for Congress and Plan H358 for the state House), enacting them into law. Plaintiffs challenged the 2013 plans as well, arguing that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans because the Legislature adopted the interim maps as a "litigation strategy" to insulate the discriminatory plans from judicial review.

Procedural history: The district court conducted extensive proceedings over several years, issuing multiple opinions addressing racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims.

Summary: Abbott v. Perez was the culmination of a decade of redistricting litigation in Texas. The Supreme Court largely reversed the district court, upholding the 2013 Texas redistricting plans and rejecting most of the racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims. The Court's key holdings were: (1) the 2013 Legislature was entitled to a presumption of good faith, and the district court erred by treating the 2013 plans as a continuation of the 2011 plans without independently proving the 2013 Legislature's discriminatory intent; (2) the district court had erred in its racial gerrymandering analysis by conflating the use of race as a factor with the "predominant factor" standard under Miller v. Johnson, though the finding of racial gerrymandering in HD90 was upheld; (3) the Section 2 vote dilution claims failed because plaintiffs could not show that an additional reasonably compact minority opportunity district was possible; and (4) the district court had not properly distinguished between racial motivation and partisan motivation, particularly in a state where race and party are highly correlated. The decision reinforced the presumption of legislative good faith in redistricting, tightened the requirements for proving racial predominance, and confirmed that Section 2 vote dilution claims require proof that an additional compact minority district is possible — not merely that the existing configuration of districts is suboptimal.

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court on most claims and upheld the 2013 Texas redistricting plans. The Court rejected the district court's finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans. The Court held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by treating the 2013 enactment as merely a continuation of the 2011 plans. The Court held that when a legislature enacts a new plan, there is a presumption of good faith and the plaintiffs must prove that the 2013 Legislature itself acted with discriminatory intent. The district court had held that the 2013 Legislature engaged in no "deliberative process" to remove discriminatory taint and "intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from remedy." The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that the 2013 Legislature's adoption of the court-drawn interim plans was legitimate and that the presumption of legislative good faith had not been overcome. The Court reversed the district court's racial gerrymandering findings for most challenged districts. The Court held that the district court had erred by conflating the use of race as a factor with the use of race as the "predominant" factor — the standard required to trigger strict scrutiny under Miller v. Johnson. The Court emphasized that the legislature "always is aware of race when it draws district lines," but the key question is whether race was used "for its own sake" rather than as one factor among many. The Court reversed the district court's Section 2 findings for CD27, HD32, and HD34, holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish a violation because they could not demonstrate that an additional reasonably compact Latino opportunity district was possible. The Court reversed the district court's "totality of the circumstances" analysis, holding that the district court had relied on flawed statistical evidence (specifically, the use of Spanish-surname voter registration data) and had incorrectly applied the Gingles preconditions. The Court emphasized that the first Gingles precondition requires the minority group to be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," and that the district court had not properly assessed whether an additional compact opportunity district was possible.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 25, 2018

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-586_o7kq.pdf

Primary Documents

Abbott v. Perez.pdf
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Abbott v. Perez

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