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Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 Opinion of the Court complicated in Texas in 2011. Not only was the Legislature required to draw districts that were substantially equal in population, see Perry, supra, at 391–392; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U. S. 1 (1964), and to comply with special state-law districting rules,2 but federal law imposed complex and delicately balanced requirements regarding the consideration of race. Then, as now, federal law restricted the use of race in making districting decisions. The Equal Protection Clause forbids “racial gerrymandering,” that is, intentionally assigning citizens to a district on the basis of race without sufficient justification. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U. S. 630, 641 (1993). It also prohibits intentional “vote dilution”— “invidiously . . . minimiz[ing] or cancel[ing] out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities.” Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 66–67 (1980) (plurality opinion). While the Equal Protection Clause imposes these important restrictions, its application in the field of districting is complicated. For one thing, because a voter’s race sometimes correlates closely with political party preference, see Cooper v. Harris, 581 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2017) (slip op., at 19–20); Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234, 243 (2001), it may be very difficult for a court to determine whether a districting decision was based on race or party preference. Here, the three-judge court found that the two factors were virtually indistinguishable.3 At the same time that the Equal Protection Clause —————— 2 See, e.g., Tex. Const., Art. III, §25 (Senate), §26 (House). 3 The court found: “[I]t is difficult to differentiate an intent to affect Democrats from an intent to affect minority voters. Making minorities worse off will likely make Democrats worse off, and vice versa.” C. J. S. Findings 467a (citation omitted). “This correlation is so strong that [an expert] assessed whether districts were minority opportunity districts by looking at Democratic results/wins (noting that in Texas, minority candidates of choice means Democrats).” Ibid.

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Abbott v. Perez

Judgment

Question Presented: Whether the 2013 Texas congressional and state House redistricting plans violated the Equal Protection Clause (racial gerrymandering), Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (vote dilution), and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (intentional discrimination) — and specifically whether the district court erred by finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans enacted by the Legislature; holding that certain districts were racial gerrymanders where race was the predominant factor; finding Section 2 vote dilution in certain districts where plaintiffs could not demonstrate that an additional compact minority opportunity district was possible; and applying the wrong legal standard in distinguishing between racial motivation and partisan motivation in redistricting.

Alleged Acts: Following the 2010 census, the Texas Legislature enacted new congressional (Plan C185) and state House (Plan H283) redistricting plans. The plans were challenged by various plaintiffs — including individual voters, the Mexican American Legislative Caucus (MALC), the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), the NAACP, and others — alleging racial gerrymandering under the Equal Protection Clause, vote dilution under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, and intentional discrimination. Texas was a covered jurisdiction under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and sought preclearance from a D.C. district court. While preclearance was pending, the W.D. Texas district court drew interim plans (Plan C220 for Congress and Plan H309 for the state House) for use in the 2012 elections. The Supreme Court in Perry v. Perez, 565 U.S. 388 (2012), vacated the interim maps, directing the district court to be more deferential to the elected branches. The interim maps were then revised. After Shelby County v. Holder (2013) effectively ended Section 5 preclearance, the Texas Legislature adopted the court-drawn interim plans (with modifications) as its 2013 plans (Plan C235 for Congress and Plan H358 for the state House), enacting them into law. Plaintiffs challenged the 2013 plans as well, arguing that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans because the Legislature adopted the interim maps as a "litigation strategy" to insulate the discriminatory plans from judicial review.

Procedural history: The district court conducted extensive proceedings over several years, issuing multiple opinions addressing racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims.

Summary: Abbott v. Perez was the culmination of a decade of redistricting litigation in Texas. The Supreme Court largely reversed the district court, upholding the 2013 Texas redistricting plans and rejecting most of the racial gerrymandering, vote dilution, and intentional discrimination claims. The Court's key holdings were: (1) the 2013 Legislature was entitled to a presumption of good faith, and the district court erred by treating the 2013 plans as a continuation of the 2011 plans without independently proving the 2013 Legislature's discriminatory intent; (2) the district court had erred in its racial gerrymandering analysis by conflating the use of race as a factor with the "predominant factor" standard under Miller v. Johnson, though the finding of racial gerrymandering in HD90 was upheld; (3) the Section 2 vote dilution claims failed because plaintiffs could not show that an additional reasonably compact minority opportunity district was possible; and (4) the district court had not properly distinguished between racial motivation and partisan motivation, particularly in a state where race and party are highly correlated. The decision reinforced the presumption of legislative good faith in redistricting, tightened the requirements for proving racial predominance, and confirmed that Section 2 vote dilution claims require proof that an additional compact minority district is possible — not merely that the existing configuration of districts is suboptimal.

Conclusion: In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the district court on most claims and upheld the 2013 Texas redistricting plans. The Court rejected the district court's finding that the 2011 discriminatory intent "carried over" into the 2013 plans. The Court held that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by treating the 2013 enactment as merely a continuation of the 2011 plans. The Court held that when a legislature enacts a new plan, there is a presumption of good faith and the plaintiffs must prove that the 2013 Legislature itself acted with discriminatory intent. The district court had held that the 2013 Legislature engaged in no "deliberative process" to remove discriminatory taint and "intended any such taint to be maintained but be safe from remedy." The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning, holding that the 2013 Legislature's adoption of the court-drawn interim plans was legitimate and that the presumption of legislative good faith had not been overcome. The Court reversed the district court's racial gerrymandering findings for most challenged districts. The Court held that the district court had erred by conflating the use of race as a factor with the use of race as the "predominant" factor — the standard required to trigger strict scrutiny under Miller v. Johnson. The Court emphasized that the legislature "always is aware of race when it draws district lines," but the key question is whether race was used "for its own sake" rather than as one factor among many. The Court reversed the district court's Section 2 findings for CD27, HD32, and HD34, holding that plaintiffs had failed to establish a violation because they could not demonstrate that an additional reasonably compact Latino opportunity district was possible. The Court reversed the district court's "totality of the circumstances" analysis, holding that the district court had relied on flawed statistical evidence (specifically, the use of Spanish-surname voter registration data) and had incorrectly applied the Gingles preconditions. The Court emphasized that the first Gingles precondition requires the minority group to be "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district," and that the district court had not properly assessed whether an additional compact opportunity district was possible.

Legal Issue(s)

Electoral Maps and Districting
Voters' Rights

Applicable Law(s): Voting Rights Act of 1965, Fourteenth Amendment, and Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution

Region: Americas

Country: United States of America

Language of Decision

English

Court: Supreme Court

Election Type: General

Date of decision: Jun 25, 2018

Geolocation

Latitude: 38.890591

Longitude: -77.004745

: Geolocation

Link: https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/17pdf/17-586_o7kq.pdf

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Abbott v. Perez.pdf
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Abbott v. Perez

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