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Nos. 56 & 58
unique facts of this case, does not further the intent of the legislature, but rather would have
forced petitioner to violate the government’s own guidance, putting herself and others at
risk. Such a view leads to “objectionable results” and “cause[s] inconvenience, hardship,
injustice[, ] mischief . . . [and] absurdity,” in general disregard of the basic tenants of
statutory interpretation (People v Ryan, 274 NY 149, 152 [1937]).
Contrary to the majority’s view (majority op at 5-6), we are not constrained by our
prior holdings in Hutson and Plunkett v Mahoney, as those cases dealt with delays and
errors that directly relate to a candidate’s “careless or inadvertent failure to follow the
mandate of statute and case law,” and not actions taken in accordance with governmental
guidance during a highly unusual and unprecedented pandemic (see Hutson, 54 NY2d at
773-74; Plunkett v Mahoney, 76 NY2d 848, 848 [1990]). Instead, this precedent stands
for the proposition that during “normal” times—when there is no life and death state of
emergency requiring residents to shelter at home and minimize physical contact with
others—the failure to timely file a cover sheet or certificate of acceptance is a “fatal defect”
(see Hutson, 54 NY2d at 773-74; Plunkett, 76 NY2d at 848). Notably, the requirement for
a cover sheet is regulatory, and our application of the election law cannot be dictated by
regulatory requirements that conflict with the purpose and intent of Chapter 24. And while
Election Law § 1-106 (2) states that failure to file a certificate is a “fatal defect,” this
provision must be read in harmony with the legislature and the executive’s ongoing actions
to protect public health during this historic pandemic.4
Petitioner’s appeal is distinguishable from Matter of Hawatmeh v New York Board of
Elections (decided today), as the delay in that case was caused by that petitioner’s need to
4
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