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Nos. 56 & 58
absolute and not subject to judicial discretion. The majority’s holding rests on several of
those cases: Matter of Carr v New York State Board of Elections (40 NY2d 556 [1976]),
Matter of Baker v Monahan (42 NY2d 1074 [1977]), Matter of Hutson v Bass (54 NY2d
772 [1981]), and Matter of Plunkett v Mahoney (76 NY2d 848 [1990]). In those cases, we
correctly implemented the 1969 legislature’s intent to create a “rigid framework of
regulation” mandating harsh time limits for election filings (see e.g. Carr, 40 NY2d at 558;
Hutson, 54 NY2d at 774).
Experience with that strict compliance framework led to widespread criticism, and
then to its abandonment. Indeed, in the years leading up to the sweeping legislative reforms
discussed below, our Court questioned the strict compliance regime in some of the very
cases upon which the majority relies. In Matter of Hutson, for example, we cautiously
noted that it was “immaterial that the courts might reasonably conclude that what they
perceive as the ultimate legislative objectives might better be achieved by more flexible
prescriptions, prescriptions which might be judged by some to be more equitable” (Matter
of Huston, 54 NY2d at 774). And, just a few years later, we amplified our prior suggestion
by noting that “a strictness of construction beyond that necessary for the effectuation of
those policies can . . . lead to injustice” in Election Law matters (Staber, 65 NY2d at 534).
The executive branch also criticized the strict compliance standard. Robert Abrams,
the State’s Attorney General, publicly wrote that New York’s laws had “spawned almost
half of all Election Law litigation in the nation” (Robert Abrams, Comprehensive Election
Law Reforms Advocated by State Attorney General; Law Day ‘92: The Struggle for
Justice, NYLJ, May 1, 1992 at 3, col 1). He denounced New York’s unyielding ballot
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