Election Investigations Guidebook Uniform Guidelines for Investigations stipulate that the decision on whether to pursue an investigation in any context should be made in accordance with the “rules, policies, and procedures of the Organization.”49 Extending this principle into the electoral context, the legal and regulatory framework should give the investigative body the discretion to develop its own uniform standards for the triage, assessment, and investigation processes. However, the decision of the investigative body must be reviewable by a court, as needed, although the investigators should be given authority to determine the standards and manner by which they prioritize and conduct investigations. One complicating factor in this process is that many EMBs still limit access to information and evidence. Often, regulations provide the legal authority for proceeding with an investigation but do not provide specific, uniform guidelines on how to systematically exercise this authority. Investigative bodies should, therefore, establish their own procedures for investigating complaints. In its complaints procedure, the National Election Commission (NEC) in Liberia states that “the hearing, investigation and determination of challenges and complaints by the NEC [are to be] organized according to rules of procedures issued by the NEC.”50 Investigators of the Australian Electoral Commission rely not only on the regulatory framework but also on the guidelines, policies, charters, and codes of conduct to inform their election complaints process.51 The roles of investigators and election officials should be clear and open to the scrutiny of any interested parties—from the relevant authorities and dispute resolution bodies to the public at large.52 In 2014, both the Federal Public Prosecutors’ Office and the Federal Police in Brazil had an investigative mandate, with researchers finding that such institutional multiplicity appears to facilitate increased monitoring and investigation of corruption—in part because the mandate and rules of each body are clearly known.53 49 Uniform Guidelines 2009, supra note 25, ¶ 31. 50 Election Comm’n of Liberia, Complaints Regulation ¶ 9.1 (2005). 51 Australian Election Complaints Management Policy, supra note 8; see generally Better Practice Guide to Complaints Handling, Commonwealth Ombudsman (2009) (outlining Australian standards for handling complaints in organizations, AEC Privacy Policy, AEC Service Charter, and Australian Public Service Code of Conduct). 52 See Violaine Autheman, IFES, The Resolution of Disputes Related to “Election Results:” A Snapshot of Court Practice in Selected Countries Around the World 6 (2004), http://aceproject.org/ero-en/topics/electoral-dispute-resolution/ConfPaper_‌Indonesia_‌FINAL.pdf. 53 Mariana Mota Prado & Lindsey Carson, Brazilian Anti-Corruption Legislation and its Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design 8 (International Research Initiative on Brazil and Africa [IRIBA], Working Paper No. 09, 2014). 36