Conclusion and Recommendations The selected case law presented in this paper demonstrates that courts and individual judges are increasingly being asked to rule on issues of incendiary and misleading content relating to elections, as well as being caught up in direct attacks under wider disinformation campaigns. At the institutional level, attacks on the judiciary aim to undermine public trust in the election process. Reforms are needed. Court administration reform can often be complex, requiring new ways of working, budgets, information technology capacity, and court officers. Nevertheless, as the threat to judiciaries from disinformation campaigns grows, it will become increasingly vital for courts to be able to institute strategic reform plans to respond to emerging threats and train judges, magistrates, and judicial officers to address these threats. The case law analysis has also shown that, despite the absence of internationally recognized definitions of disinformation, the courts have been able to assess the evidence brought before them and balance protecting free speech rights with potential harm to public interest during elections. Nevertheless, caution is needed. As the analysis above sets out, many countries have passed legislation imposing various restrictions on freedom of speech around elections. In an era of democratic backsliding and rising autocracy, it is likely that such tendencies could increase. Lawyers have become more involved in disinformation attacks around electoral processes both in and out of the courtroom. Protecting the space for citizens to enjoy their freedoms of expression and to participate in free and fair elections will likely be a continuing theme that many judiciaries will need to examine. Based on our analysis of selected cases, we make the following five recommendations for judiciaries and EMBs: 23