Chapter 1: International Standards Rights and Fundamental Freedoms recognized, for instance, that when enforcing the relevant provision ensuring free and fair elections, it is “for the Court to determine in the last resort whether [the state has complied with] the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1.”19  Thus, states may establish their own electoral complaint adjudication system as long as in the final analysis they remain within the bounds of these minimum standards.20 Whether electoral complaints are solved by a constitutional court, an independent tribunal, a legislative body or an electoral complaints commission, the international standards apply in a similar way to these different entities.21 Electoral complaint adjudication bodies should take these standards into account to best ensure that those provisions do not remain theoretical or illusory but instead serve to be practical and effective. 22 Political rights are defined through conventions, statutes and case law and are further interpreted through guidelines, codes of conduct and reports drafted by inter-governmental or non-governmental entities. Although these latter documents are not binding, they shed some light on the seven international standards that will be discussed throughout this publication. Any guide that seeks to cover the range of permutations Yumak v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 10226/03, Judgment of 8 July 2008, ¶¶ 74, 110-115, 147-148 (“’[T]he 4 percent threshold required for the election of the remaining 25 percent of the members of the Chamber of Deputies’ and even ‘a system which fixe[d] a relatively high threshold’ fell within the wide margin of appreciation . . . the threshold concerned could not be held to be contrary to the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 in that it encouraged sufficiently representative currents of thought and made it possible to avoId an excessive fragmentation of parliament.” (quoting Magnago v. Italy, App. No. 25035/94, Eur. Comm’n H.R., Dec. of 15 Apr. 1996, DR 85-A, p. 116) (citing Partija “Jaunie Demokrāti” v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 10547/07 and 34049/07, Judgment of 29 Nov. 2007)); see also Zdanoka v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 58278/00, Judgment of 16 March 2006, ¶ 115; Mathieu-Mohin v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., Series A no. 113, Judgment of 2 March 1987, ¶ 54. 20 Zdanoka v. Latvia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 58278/00, Judgment of 16 March 2006, ¶ 115 (“[It is] for the Court to determine in the last resort whether the requirements of Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 have been complied with.”). 21 Constitución Política de la República Oriental del Uruguay [Political Constitution of the Eastern Republic of Uruguay] Feb. 15, 1967, art. 322(c) (creating autonomous and independent Electoral Corte “to decIde the final determination on all appeals and claims that arise, and judge of all praise elective office of the acts of plebiscite and referendum”); see also Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Jan. 1, 1952, pt. II, art. 71 (“Any voter shall have the right to present a petition to the Secretariat of the Chamber [of Deputies] within fifteen days of the announcement of the results of the election in his constituency setting out the legal grounds for invalIdating the election of any deputy. No election may be consIdered invalid unless it has been declared as such by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Chamber.”). 22 See Krasnov v. Russia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. Nos. 17864/04 and 21396/04, ¶ 42; see also United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, Eur. Ct. H.R, App. No. 133/1996/752/951, Judgment of 30 Jan. 1998, ¶ 33. 19 15